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I posit that there is a distinct sub-culture in the U.S. military: the warrior class. Current 
civil-military relations research fails to account for this group while comparing attitudinal 
and behavioral cleavages between the two sectors. This sub-group has the potential to 
create civilian opinions and stereotypes about the military. This research accounts for this 
group by creating variables for the warrior class. I create these variables by employing 
factor analysis using eight variables that characterize the warrior class. This analysis 
reveals four distinct dimensions of the warrior class. These dimensions are the warrior 
class variables. I use these variables to measure common discussions in extant civil-
military relations research. A fear among some senior military leaders is that Americans 
are losing touch with their military. I propose, instead, the military is losing touch with 
the American people because warrior class attitudes and perceptions represent that of the 
military as a whole. I predict the warrior class will reject positive civilian sentiments 
towards the military, further exacerbating the civil-military divide. I find the warrior class 
does not reject these positive civilian sentiments, but in some cases, embraces them. The 
warrior class does, however, feel a disconnection with civilian society. Furthermore, 
previous research has found the military largely affiliates with the Republican Party and 
leans more conservative. The warrior class does not differ in this respect; they identify as 
Republicans and lean more conservative. The warrior class’s political affiliation and 
ideology have no bearing on their preference for a Democrat or Republican Commander-
in-Chief of the military. In this respect, they remain neutral in their preference for the top 
civilian leader of the military. However, I find party identification and political ideology 
are stable predictors of military preferences for Commander-in-Chief, despite warrior 
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class preferences. With this research, I am adding another consideration into scholarly 
knowledge on how we gauge civil-military relations research. I go beyond basic 
demographic variables and paint a clearer picture in the way the military thinks by 
accounting for military sub-groups.   
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 No other generation of the American military and active duty service members has 
endured war quite like that of today’s veterans. By 2015, the U.S. military will be in a state of 
constant armed conflict for nearly fourteen years in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other contingency 
operations abroad. Although academic military studies have always been around, the military 
remains one of the least studied and most misunderstood institutions in American politics. Since 
9/11, the military has seemingly become more salient in academic journals, the media, and 
commercial interests. Thus, much of what we understand about the military surfaces while our 
nation is at war and when the military is highlighted in the news and Hollywood blockbuster 
movies. Only one half of one percent of the U.S. population currently serves in the military while 
the number of veterans in Congress and the general population continues to dwindle ("The 
Military-Civilian Gap: War and Sacrifice in the Post-9/11 Era"  2011). This small, less than one 
percent of the U.S. demographic is important for American politics because it can help us better 
study and understand the military as an institution as well as a sub-population of society that has 
the potential to affect broader policy and political implications. This dissertation contributes to 
the body of knowledge by creating a specific, measurable variable for the military; a problem in 
contemporary, empirical civil-military research (Feaver, et al. 2001a, 1-6). 
 The Framers kept the military in mind while creating the United States and the 
Constitution. This is evidenced in Section Eight, Article I of the Constitution, which states 
Congress shall “raise and support Armies” and “provide and maintain a Navy.” Other evidence 
of the Framers’ concern for the military is found in the Second Amendment of the Constitution 
stating, “[A] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State…” and the 
Third Amendment. As the Constitution set the foundation for the interaction and relationships of 
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institutions within the United States, it also set the stage for political scientists to understand the 
field of American politics. Likewise, the Constitution set the foundation for the interaction of 
American military forces and civilian authority, thus emphasizing the importance for academics, 
policymakers, and concerned citizens to understand how these institutions interact. 
Problem and Purpose 
 Extant literature on military service, civil-military relations, and military culture use a 
myriad of characterizations to describe the military persona. However, there is wide consensus 
within the literature that indicates not all military members are the same; indeed, although 
society may hold the military in high esteem, often above all national level institutions, military 
scholars agree that not all soldiers are equivalent (Lewis 2012, 18-19).  
 The problem with empirical civil-military research is too much focus on the individual. 
Scholars draw conclusions that impact civil-military relations based on similarities and 
differences between individual service members and civilians derived from survey analysis and 
then base their findings on aggregated data. For example, a survey question might ask a 
respondent if s/he agrees or disagrees with the President’s policy regarding troop levels in 
Afghanistan. Summary analysis might then show percentages of civilians who agree versus 
military members who disagree, and might show averages for controls such as age, race, gender, 
education level, or political party preference. This method is not necessarily improper. However, 
there are more intricacies of a soldier than common independent and control variables account 
for.  
 In a classical sense, there is a distinction between a soldier and a warrior (Moskos 1976, 
62; Abrams and Bacevich 2001). Differences between the two can be attitudinal, behavioral, or 
motivational in how individual members interpret their military service. My dissertation 
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generalizes a set of related characteristics that describe a small population of soldier—what I 
refer to as a warrior class.  
 The purpose of this dissertation and my focus is to outline the concept of a warrior class, 
how the 20th century evolution of the military helped to enable the creation of a warrior class, 
and operationalize the concept of warrior class in an empirical analysis. Once operationalized, I 
use my measure of warrior class to explore the potential implications of this class of soldiers for 
civil-military relations. I use survey data in Chapter One of current and recent soldiers to create a 
measure of the warrior class as a specific sub-group of soldiers.  I employ factor analysis to 
ensure the validity of my operationalization of the concept of a warrior class of soldiers. I then 
examine behaviors of the warrior class in regards to a variety of relevant political and policy 
attitudes. These attitudes and behaviors include perceptions of civilian sentiments towards the 
military in Chapter Two and political attitudes such as partisanship and confidence in civilian 
leaders in Chapter Three. 
Research Question 
 Few junior and mid-level military leaders with combat experience walked amongst the 
ranks prior to 9/11.1 Over a decade later, a survey conducted by The Washington Post and Kaiser 
Family Foundation (WAPO/KFF) revealed nearly 50 percent of all military members served in 
both Afghanistan and Iraq since 9/11 (WAPO/KFF 2014).2 According to the same survey, 71 
percent of combat veterans said the average American does appreciate their service in the Iraq 
and/or Afghanistan wars. 63 percent of the same respondents said they think veterans deserve 
special advantages from employers when applying for jobs. To the layman, these numbers may 
seem staggering. To the trained observer, these numbers may be symptomatic of a military with 
                                                
1 The 1993 conflict in Somalia was the last time ground forces saw kinetic combat operations. 
2 A similar report released by the Rand Corporation in 2013 found nearly 73 percent of active component soldiers 
had deployed to Iraq and/or Afghanistan as of December 2011 (Baiocchi 2013). 
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misconceived perceptions and a sense of entitlement. However, it is unfair to lump all combat 
veterans and military members in the same “soldier” classification. This phenomenon may 
simply be “a case of a few speaking for the whole.” The pre-9/11 military was perceived to be 
contemptuous of the civilian world (Cohn 1999, 14), and this contempt may have passed on to 
the post-9/11 generation of military members. In broad terms, the question my dissertation seeks 
to answer is, “are the attitudes and beliefs of the warrior class representative of the military, writ 
large? Do they define the military or create stereotypes of the military as a whole?” I implore this 
question with three broader research questions: 
 1) Has the recent history of the U.S. military potentially created the context for the 
creation or enlargement of a sub-group of soldiers that some have called a warrior class (Murray 
1999, 29)? 
 2) Can the concept of a “warrior class” be defined and quantitatively be operationalized? 
 3) Does a measure of warrior class predict political and policy attitudes that are relevant 
to civil-military relations? If so, what are the potential implications of a warrior class within the 
U.S. military? 
Civil-Military Relations in Theory  
 Much debate regarding the proper relationship between the military and civil authority 
has pervaded scholarly research, as there is much debate regarding the proper level of political 
control and oversight over other government agencies. On one side, there are the institutional 
theorists who believe the military should be kept separate and impermeable to outside 
intervention regarding the institutional operation of the military, albeit subservient to civil 
authority and the society from which it is drawn (Huntington 1957; Nielsen and Snider 2009; 
Moskos 1971). In essence, a separate warrior class would be recruited, trained, and maintained 
 5 
entirely at the military’s discretion yet receive its wartime authority from their civil masters. On 
the other side are the convergence theorists who believe the military should be more open to 
outside intervention in order to prevent resistance to change. In theory, this would allow the 
military to be more representative of the society it serves (Janowitz 1971; Nielsen and Snider 
2009; Nielsen 2012; Feaver and Kohn 2001; Feaver 2003). 
 While there is extant empirical research on the military in political science, much of it 
tends to use military budgets (for example) as data points to understand other political 
phenomena. Other research has used military samples to understand policy analysis and 
effectiveness. In particular, some studies focused on the effects of the post-World War II GI Bill 
on veterans’ civic and political participation (Mettler and Welch 2001; Mettler 2002; Mettler and 
Welch 2004; Mettler 2005). The military is well represented in other fields of academia such as 
history, sociology, and public administration. Some academic institutions even offer courses in 
military studies while others might consider military studies a field of its own. Within military 
studies is the sub-field of Civil-Military Relations, which seeks to understand the coexistence 
and symbiotic relationships of military institutions in civil (and civilian) societies. 
 Since 9/11, further research on civil-military relations has focused on diversity within 
military and civilian populations, turning towards the effects of women in combat roles and the 
repeal of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, which prohibited homosexuals from serving openly 
in the military (Cashdollar 2010; Nuciari 2003; Disler 2010; see also Winslow, et al. 2003; Cobb 
2010).3 Other current research measures political ideology and partisan preference in contrast to 
civilian populations (Dempsey 2010). Likewise, important research regarding the effects of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) on veterans transitioning back to civilian life has received 
                                                
3 The Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy and policies limiting the role of women in combat have been repealed since 
9/11. 
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much attention by policymakers and concerned citizens (MacLean 2010; MacLean 2011). While 
the institutional and convergence theories remain important in academic debates regarding civil-
military relations, they only reach normative implications and conclusions from research with 
little, if any, empirical support (Burk 2002). The aforementioned empirical research studies 
address the “gap” theory in civil-military relations. 
The “Gap” Theory  
 In a 1997 essay in The Atlantic Monthly, Thomas Ricks identified a “gap” between 
civilian and military populations that he described as an estrangement between the two sectors of 
society.4 He attributed this estrangement to two overarching reasons, “[f]irst, more than twenty 
years after the end of conscription the ignorance of American elites about the military has 
deepened. Second, with the end of the Cold War the United States has entered into historically 
unexplored territory (Ricks 1997b, 69).” Ricks suggested an apparent contempt by many military 
members for American values and culture (Holsti 2001, 21; Ricks 1997b). He further portended 
that a political, social, and cultural gap in civil-military relations appeared to be widening and 
sought further examination in “changes in the military, changes in civilian society, and changes 
in the international-security environment” to better understand this widening gap (Ricks 1997b, 
69). 
 The same year Ricks’ (1997) essay was published, Secretary of Defense William Cohen 
voiced a similar concern in a speech at Yale University. Cohen stated in his speech:  
So one of the challenges for me is to somehow prevent a chasm 
from developing between the military and civilian worlds, where 
the civilian world doesn't fully grasp the mission of the military, 
and the military doesn't understand why the memories of our 
                                                
4 Academics, policymakers, and military leaders were aware of the differences between civilian and military 
societies starting mostly in the post-WWII era and well before Ricks’ essay. The “gap” is referenced in later 
literature, however, mostly attributed to Ricks. See Lindsay Cohn’s TISS project paper, The Evolution of the Civil-
Military ‘Gap’ Debate, for further historic discussion regarding the “gap (Cohn 1999).” 
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citizens and civilian policy makers are so short, or why the 
criticism is so quick and so unrelenting (Cohen 1997). 
 
Secretary Cohen’s concerns were similar to Ricks’ in meaning and tone. Both statesman and 
journalist identified a cultural gap where the difference in values and attitudes between military 
members and civilian society had become so wide that it could potentially threaten civil-military 
relations and the effectiveness of the military (Feaver, et al. 2001a, 1). Military academics Peter 
Feaver and Richard Kohn found an opportunity to empirically measure differences between 
civilian and military populations and initiated a comprehensive survey conducted by the Triangle 
Institute for Security Studies (TISS) (Feaver and Kohn 2001). The TISS “Survey on the Military 
in the Post-Cold War Era” consisted of 4892 individuals surveyed between 1998 and 1999. The 
survey included elite members of multiple sectors including military, civilian-veteran, and 
civilian non-veteran leaders as well as general population samples from the military and civilian 
sectors (Feaver, et al. 2001b). 
 The TISS survey opened doors for empirical research exploring the “gap” in civil-
military relations. Many studies were published in Feaver and Kohn’s book and used as a 
benchmark for further research (Feaver and Kohn 2001). However, the TISS dataset is not absent 
of shortfalls and may have outlived its relevance for many reasons. For one, it is important to 
point out that the TISS data was collected prior to 9/11. Attitudes of both civilian and military 
members have certainly changed after a decade-plus of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, not to 
mention the increased troop presence overseas (Szayna, et al. 2007). Second, there is an over-
representation of military cadets categorized as civilians in the TISS survey. There are over 3200 
civilian responses to the survey, however, over 1600 of them are cadets. Cadets were surveyed 
from university ROTC programs and all the service academies. This is problematic because 
service academy cadets are technically considered on active duty according to U.S. Code, Title 
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38, Part II, Chapter 19, Subchapter III, 1965, (1)(d), whereas ROTC cadets are not on active 
duty. In addition, the TISS data specifies all cadets as civilians. This discrepancy could have 
some bearing on the measurement of civilian responses since one could expect military cadets to 
closely resemble attitudes of active duty members and veterans. Lastly, faulty coding of civilians 
versus cadets may have overemphasized some of the findings drawn from the TISS data 
(Rahbek-Clemmensen, et al. 2012, 675). Likewise, a 2007 reexamination of the TISS survey by 
the RAND Corporation concluded the Army had no need to implement policies that might 
eliminate the civil-military gap and stated, “a civil-military gap in the United States currently is 
not a major problem in terms of the Army’s effectiveness or civilian control (Szayna, et al. 2007, 
159).” 
 The myriad of questions in the original TISS survey, subsequent research findings, and 
reexamination of the data by RAND necessitated the urge for some military academics to 
categorize gap research into separate typologies. Rahbek-Clemmensen, et al. (2012) argue that, 
“the civil-military gap can be conceptualized in terms of four distinct variants and that while the 
variants overlap somewhat, they are divergent enough to warrant consideration as distinct ideal 
types (Rahbek-Clemmensen, et al. 2012, 670).” The first type is the cultural gap, described as 
attitudinal and value differences between military and civilian populations (Rahbek-
Clemmensen, et al. 2012, 671-672; Feaver, et al. 2001a; Moskos 1971). These differences may 
include perceptions of social norms, socialization processes, or organizational path dependencies 
(Rahbek-Clemmensen, et al. 2012). The second type is the demographics gap. This is best 
described as the differences in composition of military and civilian populations by geographic 
origins, ethnicity, political affiliation, and socioeconomic or family backgrounds (Rahbek-
Clemmensen, et al. 2012, 672; Janowitz 1971; Dempsey 2010). Third is the policy preference 
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gap, which examines the differences in policy objectives pursued by military and civilian elites 
(Rahbek-Clemmensen, et al. 2012, 673; Feaver and Gelpi 2004). These policies might include 
matters of national security, military budgeting, policies regarding the implementation of the 
military in foreign policy, or policies regarding women in combat roles and homosexuals serving 
openly in the military. Finally, the institutional gap examines functional differences and 
institutional identities between civilian and military institutions (Rahbek-Clemmensen, et al. 
2012, 673-674; Feaver 2003; Janowitz and Little 1974). This may include myths and prejudices 
of each institution such as sentiments like “all military members are Republicans” or “civilians 
are losing touch with their military.” 
Culture is Key 
 Culture is emphasized in the gap thesis of civil-military relations, but it may not be 
emphasized appropriately. Individual soldier and civilian responses to survey questions gauge 
attitudes and values that are measured in the culture gap. However, as stated above, not all 
soldiers are the same and culture is not exclusive to an individual. Culture is a common belief 
system amongst a group or sub-group where like-minded attitudes and values are shared and 
mutually accepted. The U.S. Army, for example, inculcates a set of core values within soldiers, 
but organizational culture may vary from unit to unit, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) to 
MOS, or rank to rank. The warrior class is unique in that it is not exclusive to any one of these 
particular sub-groups, and a warrior culture is persistent within this group.  
 A.H. Maslow (2004)5 introduced a theory of human motivation in 1943 that described 
five basic needs for human survival: the physiological needs, safety needs, love needs, esteem 
needs, and the need for self-actualization. The esteem need and the need for self-actualization are 
                                                
5 Originally published in Psychological Review 50 (July 1943): 37-396. 
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germane to the warrior class. Maslow described esteem needs as a person’s “need or desire for a 
stable, firmly based high evaluation of themselves, for self-respect, or self-esteem, and for the 
esteem of others (Maslow 2004, 128).”  Self-esteem can be defined as the “desire for strength, 
achievement, adequacy, confidence in the face of the world, and for independence and freedom 
(Maslow 2004, 128).”  It is also defined as the “desire for reputation or prestige, recognition, 
attention, importance or appreciation” from other people (Maslow 2004, 128).  Maslow asserts 
the “[s]atisfaction of the self-esteem need leads to feelings of self-confidence, worth, strength, 
capability and adequacy of being useful and necessary in the world (Maslow 2004, 128).”  
However, neglecting any of these needs “produces feelings of inferiority, weakness, and 
helplessness (Maslow 2004, 128).” The need for self-actualization refers to a person’s desire for 
“self-fulfillment, namely, to the tendency” for a person to “become actualized in what he [or she] 
is potentially (Maslow 2004, 129).”  This tendency encapsulates the old Army mantra, “Be All 
You Can Be (Bailey 2009, 192-197; Maslow 2004, 129).” 
 James Wilson (1989) describes the importance of culture to the success (or lack of 
success) of an organization. According to Wilson, “every organization has a culture” and defines 
culture as “a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of human relationships 
within an organization. Culture is to an organization what personality is to an individual (Wilson 
1989, 91).” When an organization has a culture that is widely shared and warmly endorsed by all 
its members, including high-level managers and low-level operators, the organization has a sense 
of mission. “A sense of mission confers a feeling of special worth on members, provides a basis 
for recruiting and socializing new members and enables the administrators to economize on the 
use of other incentives (Wilson 1989, 95).” However, culture can have a positive or negative 
effect on an organization (Wilson 1989). 
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 Donna Winslow (2007) examined military culture, specifically army culture, by three 
organizational theory perspectives: integration, differentiation, and fragmentation. The 
integration perspective describes culture as the “glue” that holds an organization together by 
emphasizing a stable set of ideas, values, and norms that characterize the organization (Winslow 
2007, 68-69; Snider 1999, 14). Like Wilson’s (1989) theory of organizational culture, the 
differentiation perspective agrees that culture is shared within an organization but looks closer at 
group and sub-group culture and dynamics (Winslow 2007, 68). While culture may be shared, 
groups and sub-groups maintain the consistency of organizational culture, not the organization as 
a whole. As Winslow states, “[C]onsensus exists within the boundaries of subcultures which 
might find themselves in opposition to each other or to the organization (Winslow 2007, 68).” 
Lastly, the fragmentation perspective holds that culture is “loosely structured” or not widely 
shared throughout an organization but “emerges dynamically as cultural members experience 
each other, events and the organization’s contextual features (Winslow 2007, 68-69; Martin 
1992, 152).” 
 Winslow (2007) suggests a multidimensional approach to understanding and studying 
military (army) cultures by applying all three perspectives. Winslow assumes warfare is chaotic, 
thus the integration perspective (military as hierarchical; shared values) helps control the 
“chaotic task of waging war” in a fragmentary organization that operates in a “fluctuating and 
fluid environment that characterizes (the fog of) war (Winslow 2007, 84).”6 However, 
understanding military culture in terms of sub-groups and sub-cultures is an area of civil-military 
relations that lacks empirical research. Anecdotal evidence suggests inter-service distinctions are 
the difference between combat arms (infantry, Special Forces, artillery) and non-combat arms 
                                                
6 Clausewitz conceptualized the idea of “the fog of war.” “War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the 
factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty (Clausewitz 1976, 
101).” 
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(support roles) cultures (Builder 1989; Winslow 2007, 71). In part, these distinctions encompass 
what I refer to as the warrior class.  
Overview 
 In this dissertation, I develop an operationalized definition of the warrior class and 
examine the attitudes of its members in three separate chapters. The first chapter is a historical 
overview of the soldiering profession as described by military historians and scholars. This sets 
the stage for the genesis of a warrior class definition and lays the foundation for the necessity of 
a warrior class concept to better understand civil-military relations. In theory, a warrior class is a 
distinct sub-population of the military that can shape the rest of society’s beliefs and attitudes 
regarding the military writ large. In essence, society makes generalizations about the military, 
warranted or unwarranted, based on their perceptions of the warrior class. I further develop the 
warrior class concept and definition by operationalizing the concept using individual-level 
responses from the “2014 Survey of Iraq and Afghanistan Active Duty Soldiers and Veterans” 
conducted by The Washington Post and Kaiser Family Foundation. 
 I begin my examination of the implications of the existence of a warrior class in Chapter 
Two. Former top military leaders have expressed their fear that the American people are losing 
touch with their military because the military is less representative of the society that it serves. I 
suggest instead that the military is losing touch with the American people because the attitudes 
of the warrior class are more pervasive and dominant over the sentiments of the rest of the 
military. Using the same dataset from Chapter One, I analyze warrior class attitudes regarding 
three survey questions suggesting this military sub-culture is losing touch with the society it 
serves. These three questions are: 1) Do you think most Americans’ respect for the military is 
genuine, or do you think most Americans are just saying things they think people want to hear? 
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2) When you see a yellow ribbon honoring military service, does that make you feel good, or 
does it feel like more of an empty gesture? 3) Would you say the average American does or does 
not appreciate your service in the (Iraq war/Afghanistan war/ Iraq and Afghanistan wars)? I 
expected the warrior class would have negative responses to these questions, suggesting they 
cannot or do not accept the positive sentiments most Americans feel about their military. This is 
not the case. My analyses of these three questions reveals the warrior class does not show any 
indication of rejecting positive civilian sentiments towards the military. This may imply the 
military is not losing touch with the society they serve. Furthermore, positive responses from the 
warrior class might suggest the nature of civil-military relations in the U.S. is not as severe as 
many military scholars assert. 
 However, I analyze a fourth question from the same survey that asks, In a few words, 
could you describe how the readjustment to civilian life was difficult for you? Some of the 
responses to this question ask veterans specifically if they feel disconnected with civilian society. 
The results of my analysis for this question show the warrior class does feel disconnected from 
the society it serves even if they do not reject positive civilian sentiments towards the military. 
This may imply that the military is losing touch with the society they serve.  
 Chapter Three examines the political attitudes of the warrior class. Older research on the 
military’s political attitudes largely categorizes service members as mostly conservative in 
political ideology and Republican in their partisan leaning (Moskos 1976; Karsten 1971; Moskos 
1979; Janowitz 1971). Other scholars from the same era made the assertion that politics is 
beyond the scope of military professionals (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1971). Recent research 
on party affiliation and ideology in the U.S. Army found the Army to be relatively apolitical in 
that members do not identify with either of the two major political parties. 
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 Looking at Jason Dempsey’s (2010) data in terms of officer versus enlisted, Army 
officers identify themselves as either Democrat or Republican at rates equivalent to their civilian 
counterparts, while the low numbers of party identifiers among the enlisted ranks mostly drives 
the overall low rates of party affiliation found in the Army (Dempsey 2010). However, that is the 
army and not the warrior class. In 1997, journalist Thomas Ricks made the observation that the 
military was becoming increasingly more Republican and conservative. Two subsequent studies 
sought to test Ricks’ observation and found the military, writ large, is exactly as Ricks assumed: 
mostly Republican and conservative leaning. 
 I wade into this conversation by again employing the WAPO/KFF data to analyze the 
party identification and political ideology of the warrior class. I also examine attitudes of the 
warrior class as they relate to the only two U.S. Presidents that have served as Commander-in-
Chief of the military during both wars in Iraq and Afghanistan using two survey questions from 
the dataset. These two questions are: 1) Please tell me whether the following statement applies to 
Obama, or not? He is a good commander-in-chief of the military. 2) Thinking back to when 
George W. Bush was president, was he a good commander-in-chief of the military, or not? I find 
the warrior class leans more conservative in political ideology and affiliates more with the 
Republican Party. I expected the warrior class to prefer President Bush to President Obama as 
Commander-in-Chief of the military based on these findings. However, the warrior class shows 
no indication of preference for either president. Instead, I find political ideology and party 
affiliation are more stable predictors for military attitudes towards Presidents Bush and Obama. 
 Much of the literature discusses the idea of an existing sub-culture in the military, but 
none of these ideas are supported by empirical research. My contribution to the academy and 
civil-military research is providing a clear concept of the warrior class that is backed by 
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empirical measurements and analysis. The potential implications of a standardized concept of the 
warrior class may help future research in the civil-military divide by explaining a phenomenon 
that has been perpetuated by Hollywood, the media, and even policy-makers. There is, in fact, a 
sub-population of the military that sets the standard by which the rest of society judges the 
military, at least in the eyes of the warrior class. Furthermore, extensive research on civil-
military relations prior to 9/11 concluded there is a clear and widening gap in this relationship 
(Feaver, et al. 2001b). However, up to this point, researchers have neglected the idea that this 
distinct sub-culture within the military might be perpetuating this gap. My research will provide 
another method for exploring this gap and either support or reject previous assumptions of civil-
military relations. 
Conclusion 
 This dissertation serves to find a more thorough way to measure pervasive discussions in 
civil-military relations, particularly in the “gap” literature and research. Extant research neglects 
to account for sub-groups or sub-cultures within the military. It is folly to think such groups do 
not exist or do not have any effect on how we think about the military, whether it is a warrior 
class or any other sub-group we identify. This dissertation expands our knowledge of how we 
think about the military. It will further engage scholarly research in civil-military relations to 
account for such groups when measuring behavioral and attitudinal cleavages between the 
military and civilian worlds. As more current civil-military surveys and data become readily 
available, my concept of a warrior class and statistical methods I use to define it may serve as a 
benchmark to better understand these cleavages. Finally, this dissertation can help policymakers, 
senior military leaders, and journalists (hopefully) identify the source of such cleavages and 
break civil-military barriers and negative stereotypes regarding our military.  
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Chapter 1: Concept of The Warrior Class 
 
The spirit of an army may be envisaged as a definite moral factor that can be mentally 
subtracted, whose influence may therefore be estimated – in other words, it is a tool whose 
power is measurable. 
 - Carl von Clausewitz 
 
 The impetus for Chapter One is to operationalize a concept of a warrior class. I do this 
using data from the WAPO/KFF survey of current and recent combat veterans to create a 
measure of the warrior class as a specific sub-group of soldier. First, I identify common 
characteristics of a warrior class as described in civil-military relations literature to broadly 
define this sub-group. I use eight variables from the survey that characterize my definition. Then, 
I employ factor analysis to identify relationships between these variables. Once I am able to 
create a valid measure for this concept, I reduce the eight variables into distinct variables for the 
warrior class. Finally, I narrow my definition of a warrior class based on findings from the factor 
analysis. 
 The U.S. military is comprised of five separate service entities (Army, Navy, Air Force, 
Marines, and Coast Guard) that serve specific purposes for national defense and wartime 
activities. Each service is composed of officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted 
members selected and drawn from a diverse U.S. civilian population. The services are also 
comprised of distinct military occupational specialties (MOS) that delineate the role and purpose 
of each service member. The distinct MOSs are commonly referred to as combat arms, combat 
support, and combat service support branches. Combat arms branches are the specialties that are 
closest to combat operations and the front lines. Examples of these branches are infantry, armor, 
combat aviation, combat engineers, artillery, and Special Forces. Combat support branches 
directly support the functionality of the combat arms. For example, military intelligence, military 
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police, and signal corps activities provide direct support with combat arms branches on the 
battlefield. Combat service support branches provide more distant support to the front line 
troops, such as quartermaster (supply) services, financial, administrative, legal, religious, and 
transportation support.  
 Each military service, branch, or rank seemingly adopts a culture of their own while 
emanating the culture of their respective service component. For example, Steven Pressfield 
(2011) points out, “[N]othing infuriates Marines more than to learn that some particularly nasty 
and dangerous assignment has been given to the Army instead of to them. It offends their sense 
of honor (Pressfield 2011, 50).” Marines take pride in their ability to endure harsh conditions and 
execute daunting wartime operations. In the eyes of the Marine Corps, all marines are the same 
and expected to live up to their corps values. The Army also has its own corps values that are 
expected of every soldier, regardless of MOS. The other services are very much the same. 
 However, not all soldiers7 adopt the cultures and sub-cultures of their respective service, 
especially in the era of the all-volunteer force in a post-9/11 operating environment. 8 Soldiers 
volunteer for military service for myriad reasons. Some may join for the college benefits or to 
learn a special skill. Some may join because it is a family tradition. Others may join out of 
patriotism and a sense of duty to their country, while others may join to make a career out of 
military service. Some people might volunteer for military service out of sheer boredom or 
morbid curiosity. Regardless of one’s reason for volunteering, soldiers identify, consciously or 
unconsciously, with certain cultures and sub-cultures once they are indoctrinated into the 
military.  
                                                
7 For the purposes of this dissertation, “soldier” is used as a broad term that includes all service members. “Soldier” 
is traditionally used for members of the Army, “airman” for Air Force, “sailor” or “seaman” for Navy, and “marine” 
for Marine Corps.  
8 The U.S. military became an all-volunteer force in 1973. 
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 While each service, branch, rank, or MOS might emulate a part of military culture, not all 
soldiers are created equal (Lewis 2012, 18-23). There is a distinction between a soldier and a 
warrior, where such distinctions might contribute to the extant gap in civil-military relations 
(Gourley 2014). Warrior culture is synonymous with warrior class, where warrior class culture 
has the potential to overshadow and replace society’s perception of the military, good or bad. 
Civilians may make generalizations and create stereotypes of all military members based off the 
attitudes and values of a small class of military members. For example, former U.S. Navy Seal 
Chris Kyle published his autobiography in 2012 claiming to be the most lethal sniper in 
American military history (Kyle, et al. 2012). His book was later turned into a blockbuster movie 
released in December 2014. Both the book and movie received criticism, characterizing Kyle as 
a “racist”, trigger-happy psychopath, who “loved to kill”, despised Iraqis, and claimed to “hate 
the damn savages (Miller 2013; West 2015; see Kyle, et al. 2012).” Kyle’s personal antipathy 
towards the Iraqi people and political views toward the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are 
incommensurate with the views of all Iraq and Afghanistan veterans. However, society has 
labeled Kyle and those like him as heroes (West 2015). 
 Kyle’s reference is just one example of the problem with extant civil-military relations 
gap research; no variable exists to measure values and attitudes of sub-groups within military 
populations other than the obvious inferences by service, branch, rank, or MOS. Although 
society may hold the military in high esteem, not all soldiers are equivalent. Research must 
distinguish between values and attitudes of a few that characterize those of the whole. The 
purpose of this chapter is to distinguish between those in the military that might better be 
categorized by a characterization that I refer to as “the warrior class.” 
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 I broadly define a warrior class as a society’s military population that believes they are 
more patriotic and have higher moral and ethical values than the rest of the very society they 
serve (Clausewitz 1976; Coker 2002; Bacevich 2005). The warrior class is not exclusive to either 
officer or enlisted ranks. They are military career oriented serving in military occupations that 
make up the combat arms and those closest to the front lines (Pressfield 2011). The warrior class 
has seen more combat in Iraq and Afghanistan than the average soldier, and holds close the 
soldier bonds and brotherhood made in war (Rielly 2000; Buckingham 1999; Wong 2005). They 
are overtly proud of their war service, while military service is generational to them, meaning 
military service is a family trade (Clausewitz 1976; Builder 1989). A distinct warrior class is one 
that believes these virtues to be exclusive to the military and, therefore, should be held in higher 
esteem than other populations of the society it serves (Bacevich 2005).  
 The remainder of this chapter is comprised of several sections. First, I cover the historical 
background of the U.S. military that created the context for my broad definition of a warrior 
class. In the next section, I analyze survey data of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans in order to 
determine if my warrior class concept and definition can be operationalized in a manner to 
determine its validity. I employ factor analysis to ensure the validity of my operationalization of 
the concept of a warrior class of soldiers. Finally, I narrow my definition of the warrior class 
based on the results of the factor analysis. Although my analysis may reflect multiple dimensions 
of the warrior class concept, I am confident a modified definition will capture the essence and 
purpose of my broader definition. Thus, the operationalized warrior class variable will allow me 
to compare relevant political and policy attitudes of different soldier classes in subsequent 




As an officer in the Armed Forces of the United States you are a citizen-soldier, a warrior 
(emphasis added) in the profession of arms, a member of a skilled profession, an unwavering 
defender of the Constitution and a servant of the nation 
 (The Armed Forces Officer  2007, xiii). 
 
The idea that a society keeps a distinct warrior class has been the topic of discussion for 
political theorists throughout the ages. Plato suggested that an ideal society would be made of 
guardians and craftsmen (laborers). The guardian class would be further subcategorized into 
rulers (policymakers) and auxiliary (military). Rulers would watch over the state and make all 
decisions on behalf of the society. The auxiliary would enforce the decisions of the rulers and 
defend their society from other belligerent states in war if necessary. Cross-pollination between 
the classes would be rare, as prescribed by Plato. In essence, the auxiliary in Plato’s ideal society 
would serve as a distinct warrior class within the state (Plato 2008, 34-46). Plato’s society is akin 
to the current environment within the United States, at least from a civil-military relations 
standpoint. The U.S. military is subservient to their civilian masters and execute the orders 
decided by the policy-makers. Together, they emulate Plato’s described guardian class, but a 
common culture is not necessarily shared between the military and civilian authority.  
It is possible the idea of self-isolation from society rests in the minds of those who serve 
the warrior class. America seeks to maintain peace throughout the world through diplomacy, a 
strong economy and open trade, and a strong military. Although military options should always 
be the last resort to preserve peace, maintaining a strong warrior class requires people who are 
trained to fight and not afraid to resort to violence. It may even be suggested that warriors should 
embrace it (violence/war). This mind-set may not always resonate with a society that embraces 
peace. Samuel Huntington (1957) suggested that societies view military people to embrace a 
bellicose and authoritarian mindset. He portended, “[T]he military man is held to believe that 
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peace is stultifying and that conflict and war develop man’s highest moral and intellectual 
qualities; he favors aggressive and bellicose national policies. He is also thought to be opposed to 
democracy and to desire the organization of society on the basis of the chain of command 
(Huntington 1957, 60).” If these perceptions were mutual between civilians and the military, it 
would seem ideal for military members to identify with a warrior class. However, not all military 
members may share the same bellicose and authoritarian mind-set common of the warrior class.  
 Challenging the idea that the United States should not be concerned with their ability to 
produce combat soldiers because “all American men could serve equally well,” military historian 
Adrian Lewis (2012) suggested that not all men could serve equally (Lewis 2012, 18). He 
attributed his thesis to a combination of genes and culture, where effective combat soldiers are a 
product of nature and nurture. Lewis claims, “[n]urturing completes the hardwiring of the brain,” 
but also suggested that some people are born with certain genes that give them the propensity to 
be more keen to risk (Lewis 2012, 18-19). Lewis explains, “[R]isk-seeking genes produce 
individuals willing to put themselves in harm’s way…[W]hen the war trumpets sound, some 
individuals run toward the sound, while others run away from it (Lewis 2012, 19).” Geneticist 
Michael Stern (2010) supports the nature/nurture aspect of risk-seeking behavior. Stern claims, 
“[R]isk-sensitivity in man and other animals is complex, involving sequential life-history choices 
with genetic and environmental components and a strong interaction between the two,” and 
found that risk-taking behavior in humans is more likely to be coupled with group interactions 
and hierarchical organizations (Stern 2010, 6).9 
 While the best characteristics for effective combat soldiers are open for debate, I suggest 
the warrior class is comprised of other specific characteristics, attitudes, and values. I identify 
                                                
9 Other geneticists have found the presence of risk-seeking or sensation-seeking genes in humans (see Miles, et al. 
2001; Benis and Hobgood 2011; Thomson, et al. 2013). 
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eight traits common to the warrior class: patriotism, high moral and ethical values, a high feeling 
of camaraderie or brotherhood, unwavering pride in their profession and war service, derived 
from the combat arms branches of the military, spent more time in combat than most others, 
military career oriented, and are descended from families where military service is a tradition. 
Below I outline the rationale for including these components in my conceptualization of the 
warrior class. 
Attitude: 
 Common uses of patriot define the term as one who loves and defends one’s country. 
Patriotism and patriotic are derived from the word patriot, but not all people who are patriotic or 
show patriotism are defenders of their country. However, as the Prussian war theorist, Carl von 
Clausewitz, claims, patriotism and a patriotic spirit are principle moral elements of any military 
unit (Clausewitz 1976, 186).10 The warrior class responds to their sense of patriotism as 
Christopher Coker suggests, “[F]or the true warrior has a vocation. He hears the call; he responds 
to an inner voice…such as civic duty or patriotism (Coker 2007, 6).” 
 Patriotism is not a prerequisite for military service, but it is for a few military members. 
According to U.S. law, officers of each military service (Marines as a component of the Navy) 
are required to be good examples of patriotism. Title 10 U.S. Code, Sections 5947, 3583, and 
8583 each state, “[A]ll commanding officers and others in authority in the (Naval Services, 
Army, Air Force) are required to show themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, 
and subordination (The Armed Forces Officer  2007).”  
 However, patriotism is not exclusive to military officers. Recent polls show 61% of post-
9/11 veterans consider themselves more patriotic than other Americans compared to 37% of 
                                                
10 The principles and theories of warfare as prescribed by Carl von Clausewitz in his unpublished book, On War, are 
widely used, recognized, and quoted in U.S. Army and Joint doctrine. 
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civilians who feel the same (Pew Social 2011, 11). Likewise, 63% of Iraq and/or Afghanistan 
veterans think, “military members are more patriotic than the average person who is not in the 
military (WAPO/KFF 2014)” This is a stark contrast to research on soldiers in Vietnam that 
found them to have, “a general aversion to overt patriotic appeals (Moskos 1976, 62; Moskos 
1975, 36).” 
 As with patriotism, moral and ethical qualities are also a legal requirement of military 
officers. Title 10 U.S. Code, Sections 5947, 3583, and 8583 also state, “[A]ll commanding 
officers and others in authority in the (Naval Services, Army, Air Force) are required to guard 
against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices (The Armed Forces Officer  2007).” The 
military goes to great lengths to inculcate good morals and values in each of its service members. 
Most of the services have their own creed, values, or ethos that is bestowed among their ranks. 
The Army has even gone so far as to order their members to carry dog tags with the Army values 
etched into the metal on one side and their “warrior ethos” etched on the other (Bailey 2009, 
249). This is supposed to be a constant reminder of exactly how important good morals and 
values are to the soldier, military, and nation as a whole.  
 A warrior class is expected to hold high morals and values in personal life and on the 
battlefield. It is a time-honored warrior tradition. Coker (2002) states, “[F]or true warriors, war-
making is not so much what they do but what they are. In that sense, the true warrior is a moral 
agent (Coker 2002, 6).” Many soldiers tend to believe they are morally and ethically superior to 
the rest of society, which can become toxic for civil-military relations when service members 
start to think they are special or “better than the society they serve (Bacevich 2005, 24).” A 2003 
Military Times poll revealed two-thirds of the military said they think they have higher moral 
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standards than the rest of Americans while over 60% said the “country’s moral standards” are 
either “fair or poor (Trowbridge 2004; see Bacevich 2005, 24).” 
Warrior Bonds: 
 Hollywood often depicts war as the horror and carnage man inflicts upon his fellow man. 
However, an underlying theme in many of these films such as Saving Private Ryan, Lone 
Survivor, Band of Brothers, and Blackhawk Down highlight the brotherhood and human bonds 
forged in combat. These movies depict the reason why soldiers fight: they fight for the lives of 
the men fighting with them. The bond formed in combat is the strongest motivation for soldiers 
to fight for each other (Rielly 2000; Buckingham 1999; Wong 2005). Loyalty to one’s fellow 
soldier is part of what makes a warrior a professional (Army 2009, 3-5). This component of 
warrior professionalism is expected of all soldiers and depicted in these films. Research on film 
and trust in institutions has shown, “[T]o some degree, public confidence in the military is a 
result of the professionalism exhibited on the battlefield (King and Karabell 2003, 28).”  
 Carl von Clausewitz, the U.S. military’s foremost progenitor on all things related to war, 
suggested that the brotherhood formed in combat and one’s actions in war should be taken with 
great professional pride. He defined brotherhood as membership to “a kind of guild” where the 
conduct of war is “given pride of place (Clausewitz 1976, 187).” Pride is a military characteristic 
that all good “armies” should possess, or as Clausewitz stated, “[P]rofessional pride is the bond 
between the various natural forces that activate the military virtues (Clausewitz 1976, 187).”11 
Carl Builder (1989) succinctly sums up the relationship between warrior class pride and 
brotherhood: 
                                                
11 Clausewitz refers to military units as armies (army) and rarely mentions navy or marines since all his war 
observations were in European land battles. Air forces were not invented prior to his observations. However, his 
theories are widely considered in all the U.S. military branches. 
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The combat arms or branches of the Army are guilds – associations 
of craftsmen who take the greatest pride in their skills, as opposed 
to their possessions or position. The guilds are joined in a 
brotherhood because, like brothers, they have a common family 
bond (the Army) and a recognition of their dependency upon each 
other in combat (Builder 1989, 33). 
 
The mention of combat arms is important here because it is also a component of my defined 
warrior class as described in the next category.  
Spartans: 
 The warrior’s place is in combat. This is where the warrior class feels most comfortable; 
the place they are willing and eager to embrace adversity (Pressfield 2011, 50). Most soldiers 
hope to avoid the perils and turmoil of harsh combat, or at least approach it with extreme 
caution. On the other hand, warriors welcome this danger (Coker 2007, 4). Vietnam War critic 
and retired Army officer David Hackworth wrote in reference to his experience in the Korean 
War, “[M]y adrenaline was running fast and I wanted to be where the action was. I couldn’t stop 
talking about it…I was ready to try out my warrior wings. I wanted to prove myself, I wanted to 
win the Combat Infantryman’s Badge (CIB). I just wanted to go – so badly it hurt (Hackworth 
1989, 47; see Lewis 2012, 19).”  
 Many soldiers train and prepare their entire military careers and never see combat. The 
warrior class, on the other hand, cannot wait to go back to combat and have spent more time in 
combat than most other soldiers. A former Vietnam era Navy SEAL wrote, “[T]he main fight in 
SEAL Team was to return to Vietnam (Constance 1997, 238; see Coker 2007, 4).” Coker (2007) 
explains war to be a transformative experience for a warrior. War is the crucible in which the 
warrior class tries out their warrior wings. The transformative effect, Coker writes, “…allows a 
warrior to tap into the vein of his own heroism. It allows him to lead an authentic life. In that 
sense, his life is never quite the same again (Coker 2007, 4-5).” 
 26 
 The combat arms branches of the military are mostly the ones that train for this adversity. 
The likelihood of a military cook or finance officer to want to prove their worth in combat is rare 
and unlikely. However, military values and ethos require the same commitment from each of its 
members, meaning cooks and finance officers must also know how to fight.  
Professionals: 
 Members of the warrior class seek to make a career out of war or the pursuit of war in the 
military. The warrior class also comes from families where military service to country is a family 
tradition. Jason Dempsey’s (2010) research on the Army found that 11% of soldiers and 21% of 
officers had a parent who was a military career professional. Another 39% of the army had a 
parent who served in the military at one point, but did not make it a career (Dempsey 2010, 40-
41). Familial ties to the military might instill a sense of servitude, patriotism, and pride and 
initiate an institutionalization process within the warrior class. Charles Moskos (2001) explains, 
“[M]embers of an institution are often seen as following a calling, captured in words like duty, 
honor, and country (Moskos 2001, 30).” The warrior class family tradition is more exclusive to 
their immediate family and is also generational. This means that an immediate parent, mother or 
father, served in the military and fostered these virtues into their warrior child. Many soldiers 
have uncles or cousins who served, but the nurturing process is not as effective unless that 
relative lives in the household. Likewise, the generational aspect of the warrior family tradition 
extends to a grandparent. Many soldiers have only a grandparent who served, but the warrior 
class has an immediate parent and a grandparent who served.  
 Pride is used as an extension of patriotism, as is professional pride. Professional pride is 
also viewed as a functioning component of national service. Military service is not the only way 
one can serve his or her own country, but professional pride in the service to one’s own country 
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is a mandatory characteristic that must be present in any army (Clausewitz 1976, 187). Likewise, 
duty, honor, and country are cornerstones to the virtues one possesses to the service of their 
country. Service to country may not be the only reason people join the military, but it is an 
important virtue of the warrior class and military careerism. Nesbit and Reingold (2011) found 
this point valid and suggested, “[M]ost Americans view military members as men and women 
who are willing to set aside their own self-interest to follow the path of duty and honor in serving 
their country (Nesbit and Reingold 2011; see Moskos 2000).” 
Data and Methods 
 The data I use to operationalize my definition of a warrior class comes from a March 
2014 survey of post-9/11 combat veterans. The Washington Post and Kaiser Family Foundation 
conducted this survey titled, “Survey of Iraq and Afghanistan Active Duty Soldiers and 
Veterans,” from August 1 to December 15, 2013. To date, The Washington Post has published 
18 articles online with this dataset under a column called After the Wars. These articles can be 
found online at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/pb/after-the-wars. According to the toplines 
and methodology report released in March 2014, “819 adults who served in the Iraq or 
Afghanistan wars as members of the U.S. military in the period after the terrorist attack of Sept. 
11, 2001 (including 231 who are currently on active duty),” were surveyed for the study 
(WAPO/KFF 2014). I use data from eight specific survey questions to create variables and 
operationalize my definition of a warrior class. 
 There is a minor shortfall with the data I use. The survey did not collect responses from a 
civilian population. Civil-military gap research is dependent on comparing attitudes and values 
of civilian and military populations. Although this chapter and dissertation focus on sub-groups 
within the military, I am not able to use this dataset for future research involving civilians. 
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However, once I am able to obtain a valid operationalized measure of a warrior class, I will be 
able to use the method with similar datasets that gauge responses from civilian and military 
populations.  
 Key Variables. This chapter uses eight key variables in a factor analysis in order to 
identify structure in the relationship between variables and classify them. Each variable 
represents a characteristic or attitude I use to define a warrior class. These characteristics and 
attitudes are, 1) Individual believes s/he is more patriotic than the rest of civil society, 2) 
Individual believes s/he has better moral and ethical values than the rest of society, 3) Military 
career oriented; planned to make military a career, 4) Spent more time in Iraq and Afghanistan 
than other soldiers, 5) Served in combat in a Combat Arms role, 6) Holds close the ‘brotherhood 
and soldier bonds’ made in war, 7) Proud of individual war service, and 8) Military is a family 
tradition. 
 I operationalize the first variable using question 12a from the survey. The question asks: 
“Do you think the average member of the military is more or less patriotic than the average 
person who is not in the military, or are they no different?” Responses are: 1) More – 66.7%, 2) 
Less – 1.8%, 3) No different – 28.7%, 8) Don’t know – 0%, and 9) Don’t know/refused – 2.8%. I 
create a dummy variable coding “More” as 1, “Less” as 0, and “No different” as 0. I drop all 
“Don’t know” and “Don’t know/refused” responses. After I recode, 1=66.7%, 0=30.5%, and 
drop=2.8%. I label this variable “Patriotic” for use in tables. 
 I operationalize the second variable using question 12b from the survey. This question 
asks: “Do you think the average member of the military tends to have better or worse moral and 
ethical values than the average person who is not in the military, or are they no different?” 
Responses are: 1) Better – 53.2%, 2) Worse – 3.2%, 3) No different – 40.9%, 8) Don’t know – 
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0%, and 9) Don’t know/refused – 2.7%. I create a dummy variable coding “Better” as 1, 
“Worse” and “No different” as 0, and drop “Don’t know/refused.” After recoding, 1=53.2%, 
0=44%, and drop=2.69%. This variable is labeled “Moral_Ethical” for use in tables.  
 The third variable regarding military career plans is operationalized using question 9, 
which asks: “When you first joined the military, did you plan to serve for a long career of at least 
20 years or detach after a shorter period?” Responses are: 1) For at least 20 years – 49.9%, 2) 
Detach after a shorter period – 41.8%, and 8/9) Don’t know/Refused – 8.3%. I also turn this into 
a dummy variable coding “For at least 20 years” as 1, “Detach” as 0, and drop “Don’t 
know/Refused.” All percentages remain the same after recoding. I label this variable 
“Career_Oriented” for use in tables. 
 The fourth variable concerns those who spent more time in combat. The survey asks a 
series of questions regarding one’s service in Iraq or Afghanistan. The values for responses are 
computed in months and years. The possible responses for months range from 1 to 60 and 1 to 9 
for years spent in either war. In this day and age, one year is a long time to spend in any war. A 
year is also the typical deployment length for larger units deploying to the wars. Individual 
augmenters, smaller units, and specialized units can deploy for longer or shorter periods 
depending on their purpose and rotation frequency. However, a member of the warrior class 
would seek deployment in both wars to test out his/her “warrior wings.” In this sense, I 
operationalize this variable by aggregating those who spent a year or more in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Thus, the minimum amount of years spent in combat for filling this warrior class 
trait is two years (one year for each war).  
 The survey questions I use are 44/45y and 47/48y. The questions ask: “How many times 
were you deployed in support of the war in Iraq (Q44) or Afghanistan (Q47)?” Respondents who 
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deployed at least once were then asked: “Altogether, how many months or years (Q45y/Iraq, 
Q48y/Afghanistan) did that add up to?” Since the possible responses for these questions range 
from 1 to 9 (coincides with sum of years deployed), all missing values are those who had not 
deployed at least a year in either war. I create dummy variables for each war, coding 1 thru 9 
years deployed as 1 and missing values as 0.12 29.2% of respondents spent a year or more in Iraq 
compared to 70.8% who did not. Likewise, 15% of respondents spent a year or more in 
Afghanistan compared to 85% who did not. After each dummy variable is created, I aggregate 
them into one variable, which yields 36.6% of respondents who deployed to both Iraq and 
Afghanistan for a year or more. 63.4% do not meet this requirement. This variable is labeled 
“Longer_Combat” for use in tables.  
 I use survey question 50 to operationalize the combat arms variable. This question asks: 
“While serving in the war(s) in Iraq and/or Afghanistan did you serve in combat arms or combat 
support?” Responses were: 1) Combat arms – 33.1%, 2) Combat support – 55.3%, 3) Both – 
6.8%, 4) Neither – 3.4%, and 8/9) Don’t know/Refused – 1.3%. Soldiers serving in both combat 
arms and support roles in not strange. Some soldiers, especially junior enlisted and junior 
officers, transfer branches after their initial service obligation. This is unlikely to occur during a 
single deployment, so those who served in both roles are likely to have multiple deployments. 
Likewise, serving in neither role is not strange. There is a third component to most of the 
services that is not accounted for in this question. The combat service support branches are 
comprised of the logistical, legal, medical, administrative, and financial branches of the services. 
Some of these soldiers may have responded to “combat support” in absence of a “combat service 
                                                
12 I did not drop missing values for this variable because missing values for Q45y and Q48y did not indicate a non-
deployment. Missing values for these questions could have meant that a respondent had deployed to that war, but 
not for a total duration of a year. Likewise, all respondents served in either Iraq or Afghanistan as criteria for 
participation in the survey. Only six of 819 respondents asnswered “don’t know/refused.” 
 31 
support” option. I create a dummy variable coding “Combat arms” and “Both” as 1, “Combat 
support” and “Neither” as 0, and drop “Don’t know/Refused.” After recoding, 1=39.9%, 
0=58.7%, and drop=1.3%. I label this variable “Combat_Arms” for use in tables. 
 The brotherhood and soldier bonds variable is more difficult to operationalize. Survey 
question 55 asks: “Is there anything at all you miss about your time serving in the Iraq and/or 
Afghan war(s) or not?” Responses are: 1) Yes – 54.6%, 2) No – 43.8%, and 8/9) Don’t 
know/Refused – 1.6%. Respondents that answer, “Yes” are then directed to questions 55a-1 thru 
55a-0 (55a-10), which asks: “Can you say a little bit about what you miss?” All possible 
responses are the same for Q55a-1 thru Q55a-0. Respondents can only provide one answer for 
each question and answer up to ten times; hence ten identical answers. Respondents do not have 
to answer all ten times. All iterations have 36 possible responses. Answers 1 thru 33 range 
anywhere from “The friends I made” to “The Food. ” Answers 97, 98, and 99 are “Other,” 
“Don’t know,” and “Don’t know/Refuse.” I create a dummy variable for each question and 
choose six answers that relate to camaraderie, brotherhood, and soldier bonds. I code these six 
answers as 1, all remaining answers thru 33 as 0, “Other” as 0, and drop “Don’t know/Refused.” 
I also code missing values for each question as 0.13 
 After I create ten dummy variables for Q55a-1 thru Q55a-0, I aggregate them into one 
dummy variable. The six answers I use for each question are: 1) “The friends I made,” 2) 
“Camaraderie/brotherhood/soldier bonds,” 3) “The people I worked with/fellow soldiers 
(general),” 4) “Soldiers who died,” 5) “Other fellow soldiers mentions (sic),” and 21) 
“Teamwork/group of people working together for common goal.” After I recode and aggregate 
                                                
13 There are no missing values in Q55. Missing values for Q55a-1 thru Q55a-0 reflects “No” answers for Q55 and 
finished responses past Q55a-1. For example, Q55a-1 shows 372 missing values, which reflects the 359 “No” 
responses and 13 “Don’t know/Refused” responses in Q55. Q55a-7 thru Q55a-0 all have 819 missing values 
(n=819) because no one responded more than six times. 
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the ten questions, 1=36.4% and 0=63.6%. This variable is labeled “Brotherhood” for use in 
tables.  
 I operationalize the variable for pride in one’s war service using survey question 57a. The 
question asks: “Not asking any details, but just generally…would you say you did anything in 
the Iraq and/or Afghanistan war(s) that made you feel proud, or not?” Responses are: 1) Yes, 
often – 53.5%, 2) Yes, sometimes – 30.0%, 3) Yes, rarely – 4.9%, 4) No – 9.9%, and 8/9) Don’t 
know/Refused – 1.7%. I create a dummy variable coding all three “Yes” variants as 1, “No” as 0, 
and drop “Don’t know/Refused.” After I recode, 1=88.4%, 0=9.9%, and drop=1.7%. I label this 
variable “War_Pride” for use in tables. 
 Military service is a family tradition and generational in the warrior class, meaning an 
immediate parent and a grandparent served or both parents served. I use survey questions 81 and 
81a-1 thru 81a-3 in order to operationalize the family tradition variable. Question 81 asks: “Did 
either of your parents or any of your grandparents serve in the military, or not?” Responses are: 
1) Yes – 74.8%, 2) No – 24.4%, and 8/9) Don’t know/Refused - .7%. Those who answer, “Yes” 
are directed to Q81a-1, which asks: “Who served?” Choice responses are: 1) Mother, 2) Father, 
3) Grandparent(s), and 8/9) Don’t know/Refused. If a respondent has a mother who served and a 
father or grandparent who served, that person selects “Mother” in Q81a-1 and then moves on to 
Q81a-2, which has the same selection choices. If the same person has a father and grandparent 
who served, they select “Father” in Q81a-2 and “Grandparent(s)” in Q81a-3. This seems fairly 
obvious, but the frequencies in the dataset are misleading. For example, “Mother” is accounted 
for in Q81a-1 but not in Q81a-3 if the respondent has a mother, father, and grandparent who 
served. Only “Grandparent(s)” is accounted for in Q81a-3 while “Mother” and “Father” are 
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dropped into the missing values. There are only 17 responses (2.1%) for “Grandparent(s)” in this 
question while missing values has a count of 802 (97.9%). 
 I create a separate dummy variable for each question. In Q81a-1, I code “Mother” as 1, 
“Father” and “Grandparent(s)” as 0, “Don’t Know/Refused” as drop, and missing values as 0. I 
code Q81a-2 and Q81a-3 the exact same way except “Father” and “Grandparent(s)” are coded as 
1. I then aggregate all three dummy variables into one dummy variable. After recoding, 
1=25.2%, which are respondents who had both an immediate parent and grandparent serve, or 
both parents and a grandparent served, or both parents served. Those who have one family 
member who served or no family members who served are coded as 0 (74.9%). This variable is 
labeled “Family_Trade” for use in tables.  
Findings 
 Using the eight variables that characterize my definition of the warrior class, I employ 
factor analysis to identify relationships between these variables. Factor analysis is a multivariate 
statistical method where the goal is to “identify the underlying relationships between manifest 
variables (Norris and Lecavalier 2010, 8).” I specifically employ exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) as opposed to confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). EFA is commonly used when no 
underlying assumption exists regarding the relationship between variables or there is little 
supporting evidence for factor structure between variables (Norris and Lecavalier 2010; Fabrigar, 
et al. 1999; Reio and Shuck 2014). CFA is better used when theory or extant research supports 
an assumption of the relationship between variables (Treiblmaier and Filzmoser 2010; Norris and 
Lecavalier 2010). Likewise, research has shown that EFA produces more accurate common 
factor model results than CFA (Fabrigar, et al. 1999, 276) and guides researchers in building 
theory by exploring relationships among variables (Reio and Shuck 2014). 
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 I first use the principal factor method of EFA to generate communality and factor loading 
estimates. Communalities are described as “the proportion of observed variance due to common 
factors, or the total amount of variance for an item explained by the extracted factors (Norris and 
Lecavalier 2010, 10).” Communalities range from zero to one and tabulated as “uniqueness” as 
seen in the lower half of Table 1a. This table shows the “percentage of variance for the variable 
that is not explained by the common factors (STATA 2013, 306).” The principal factor method 
computes factor loadings or factor patterns using the squared multiple correlations (SMC) as 
estimates of the communality (STATA 2013, 302). In general, the more “uniqueness” a variable 
contains, the less relevant it is in the factor model. As seen in the lower half of Table 1a, all 
variables describing the warrior class have a high level of uniqueness, thus weakening the factors 
obtained using the principal factor method. Furthermore, Kaiser criterion suggests I retain factors 
with eigenvalues equal or greater than one (Kaiser 1974; Norris and Lecavalier 2010; 
Treiblmaier and Filzmoser 2010). The top half of Table 1a shows all factors have eigenvalues 
less than one. Consequently, the principal factor method of EFA is not a suitable method to 
identify relationships between warrior class variables. 
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Factor 1 0.46858 0.21636 1.3622 1.3622 
Factor 2 0.25222 0.15933 0.7332 2.0955 
 
Factor 3 0.09289 0.01977 0.2701 2.3655 
 
Factor 4 0.07312 0.10424 0.2126 2.5781 
 
Factor 5 -0.03112 0.09829 -0.0905 2.4876 
 
Factor 6 -0.12941 0.03608 -0.3762 2.1114 
 
Factor 7 -0.16549 0.05131 -0.4811 1.6303 
 
Factor 8 -0.21680 . -0.6303 1.0000 
 
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Uniqueness 
Patriotic 0.3883 -0.1586 0.0522 0.0267 0.8206 
 
Moral_Ethical 0.3687 -0.1852 0.0722 -0.0157 0.8243 
 
Career_Oriented 0.0239 0.0625 0.1887 0.0672 0.9554 
 
Longer_Combat 0.1239 0.1881 0.0551 -0.1805 0.9137 
 
Combat_Arms 0.1677 0.3079 0.0665 -0.0303 0.8717 
 
Brotherhood 0.2412 0.1599 -0.1639 0.0525 0.8866 
 
War_Pride 0.2811 0.0678 -0.0998 0.0456 0.9043 
 
Family_Trade -0.0247 0.1689 0.0711 0.1712 0.9365 
Retained factors 





    
Note: Exploratory Factor Analysis. Principal factors method. Unrotated. LR test: independent vs saturated: chi2(28)=124.19 
Prob>chi2=0.000. Data is from August 1 to December 15, 2013 Survey of Iraq and Afghanistan Active Duty Soldiers and 
Veterans. 
 
 Although the principal factors method I use for EFA does not yield suitable results, it 
provides me an indicator that there are possibly four factors or dimensions that comprise the 
warrior class by the positive eigenvalues of the first four factors. EFA is considered a relatively 
subjective statistical procedure, but it also allows researchers to employ a number of different 
 36 
factor analysis methods aside from the principal factors method (Norris and Lecavalier 2010, 
10). Other methods include principal-component factors, iterated principal factors, and 
maximum likelihood factors (see STATA 2013, 300-315; Treiblmaier and Filzmoser 2010, 198). 
While the principal factors method uses SMC to compute factor loadings or factor patterns to 
retrieve communality (“uniqueness”) estimates, meaning they can range from zero to one, the 
principal-component factors method assumes all communalities to be one.14 This method is akin 
to principal component analysis (PCA) where communalities are held at one. However, PCA is 
more appropriate when the goal is data reduction whereas EFA’s goal is to examine underlying 
constructs within the data (Norris and Lecavalier 2010). 
 SMC used in principal factors method is considered “lower bound” for estimating 
communalities (Norris and Lecavalier 2010, 11). However, an iterative procedure is acceptable 
for estimating communalities by starting with a given value of communalities, such as one, using 
the principal-component factoring method (Norris and Lecavalier 2010). Looking at Table 1b, 
we can see that principal-component factoring is a more suitable method of identifying 
relationships between the variables with the given data. The positive eigenvalues of the first four 
factors supports my notion that there are four dimensions that explain the warrior class. 
Likewise, these four factors hold eigenvalues greater than or equal to one. This means those 
factors are acceptable to retain using the Kaiser criterion. Furthermore, seven of the eight 
variables hold low “uniqueness” values, meaning less than 50% of their variance is not shared 
with the other variables.15 I do not drop the “War_Pride” variable from the factor analysis 
                                                
14 “The squared multiple correlation (SMC) of a variable is that variable’s percent of variance shared with all other 
variables in the analysis (Norris and Lecavalier 2010, 11).” 
15 Lower “uniqueness” means the variable has higher relevance in the factor model while higher “uniqueness” has 
lower relevance in the model.  
 37 
because of its normative relevance to the warrior class, but it is important to note that 60.95% of 
its variance is not shared with the other variables making it less relevant to the factor model. 
 











Factor 1 1.40491 0.20035 0.1756 0.1756 
 
Factor 2 1.20456 0.13946 0.1506 0.3262 
 
Factor 3 1.06510 0.01842 0.1331 0.4593 
 
Factor 4 1.04668 0.10567 0.1308 0.5902 
 
Factor 5 0.94101 0.10935 0.1176 0.7078 
 
Factor 6 0.83166 0.03732 0.1040 0.8117 
 
Factor 7 0.79434 0.08259 0.0993 0.9110 
 
Factor 8 0.71174 . 0.0890 1.0000 
 
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Uniqueness 
Patriotic 0.6300 -0.3685 0.2220 0.0253 0.4175 
 
Moral_Ethical 0.5962 -0.4216 0.2311 -0.1179 0.3995 
 
Career_Oriented 0.0482 0.1800 0.7480 -0.0299 0.4049 
 
Longer_Combat 0.2498 0.4038 -0.0933 -0.7044 0.2696 
 
Combat_Arms 0.3303 0.6516 0.0900 -0.1716 0.4287 
 
Brotherhood 0.4545 0.2842 -0.4398 0.3712 0.3815 
 
War_Pride 0.5208 0.0833 -0.2067 0.2639 0.6095 
 
Family_Trade -0.0324 0.4281 0.3873 0.5461 0.3675 
Retained factors 





    
Note: Exploratory Factor Analysis. Principal-component factors method. Unrotated. LR test: independent vs saturated: 
chi2(28)=124.19 Prob>chi2=0.000. Data is from August 1 to December 15, 2013 Survey of Iraq and Afghanistan Active Duty 
Soldiers and Veterans. 
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 Before the four factors can be retained and converted into new variables, the factor 
loading must be rotated in order to obtain a clearer picture of the relevance of each variable in 
the factor model. Factor rotation helps “obtain simple structure in order to enhance 
interpretability of the solution (Norris and Lecavalier 2010, 11).” Two types of rotation are 
commonly used in factor analysis: orthogonal and oblique rotations. Orthogonal rotation requires 
that extracted factors should not be correlated (Norris and Lecavalier 2010). Even though 
orthogonal methods may produce stable results, it will produce unrealistic solutions when factors 
are correlated (Treiblmaier and Filzmoser 2010). Therefore, an oblique rotation method “better 
reproduces reality” and does not require factors to be correlated (Treiblmaier and Filzmoser 
2010, 199). Likewise, not having correlated factors is “rarely the case in social and behavior 
[science] research (Norris and Lecavalier 2010, 11).” Thus, an oblique method is optimal for my 
factor analysis.  
 After the pattern matrix is produced from the oblique rotation, I retain variables in a 
particular factor with loading values greater than 0.40. There are many recommendations in 
extant literature regarding how to retain variables in a factor based on the factor loading value. 
For instance, a factor loading of 0.60 or higher may be considered a “strong” recommendation to 
retain a variable (Marsh and Hau 1999; see also Norris and Lecavalier 2010, 12). This is mostly 
relevant when using data with small sample sizes (Marsh and Hau 1999). However, a threshold 
of 0.40 or higher is suitable for exploratory purposes (Nimon, et al. 2011; Mvududu and Sink 
2013), as in the case of this chapter. As shown below in the middle portion of Table 1c, the four 
extracted factors each retain two variables after an oblique rotation with a factor loading 
threshold above 0.40.  
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Factor 1 1.29513 0.1619 
 
  
Factor 2 1.17783 0.1472 
 
  
Factor 3 1.15504 0.1444 
 
  
Factor 4 1.09845 0.1373 
 
  
(Rotated factors are 
correlated) 
    
 
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Uniqueness 
Patriotic 0.7564    0.4175 
 
Moral_Ethical 0.7737    0.3995 
 
Career_Oriented    0.6469 0.4049 
 
Longer_Combat   0.8377  0.2696 
 
Combat_Arms   0.6371  0.4287 
 
Brotherhood  0.7856   0.3815 
 
War_Pride  0.5794   0.6095 
 
Family_Trade    0.7400 0.3675 
Retained factors 





    
 











Factor 1 0.7538 0.5500 0.3666 0.0658 
 
Factor 2 -0.5177 0.3341 0.6174 0.5065 
 
Factor 3 0.3757 -0.5297 0.0403 0.7265 
 
Factor 4 -0.1507 0.5525 -0.6948 0.4597 
Note: Exploratory Factor Analysis. Principal-component factors method. Oblique rotation using promax. LR test: independent vs 
saturated: chi2(28)=124.19 Prob>chi2=0.000. Data is from August 1 to December 15, 2013 Survey of Iraq and Afghanistan 
Active Duty Soldiers and Veterans. 
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 The middle portion of Table 1c reveals the new pattern matrix after rotation keeping 
values above 0.40. The bottom portion of the table is a structure or factor rotation matrix. Since I 
use an oblique rotation method, research suggests considering both pattern and structure matrixes 
when attributing a label to a factor (Mvududu and Sink 2013; Reio and Shuck 2014; Fabrigar, et 
al. 1999; Norris and Lecavalier 2010). Naming a factor should capture the essence of the 
components comprised of the factor and capture “as a whole the conceptual meaning of each 
variable defining a particular latent dimension (Mvududu and Sink 2013, 90; see also Reio and 
Shuck 2014, 20).” Naming the factors is somewhat of a subjective process, however, literature 
supporting my research is also considered before naming factors (Reio and Shuck 2014). 
 The Patriotic and Moral_Ethical variables comprise factor one. These variables capture 
the attitudes and appeal for military service. They also capture how the warrior class compares 
themselves to the rest of civil society. I name this dimension (factor) of the warrior class, 
“Attitude.” Brotherhood and War_Pride pair well in factor two. These variables are also 
attitudinal, yet capture more of the emotional appeal the warrior class gains from their 
experience in war. I name this dimension “Warhood” as a combination of brotherhood and war 
pride. The third factor is comprised of the Longer_Combat and Combat_Arms variables. Since a 
warrior’s place is in combat where they are willing and eager to embrace adversity (Pressfield 
2011), these variables pair parsimoniously in the third dimension. Combat arms branches are 
closer to the “front lines” and experience more of the carnage in war. Like the Spartans of 
ancient Greece, the warrior class misses war and cannot wait to go back (Junger 2014). Thus, 
“Spartans,” is a suitable name for the third dimension of the warrior class. Lastly, 
Career_Oriented and Family_Trade also pair parsimoniously in the fourth factor. These variables 
capture the desire of the warrior class to make a profession of the military that is traditional 
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within warrior class families. Naming this factor, “Professional,” captures the fourth dimension 
of the warrior class.  
Conclusion: 
 This chapter was motivated by the need to analyze civil-military relations in a better 
manner. Current research in the field examines civilian and military attitudes by different 
characteristics. From the military perspective, research examines attitudinal differences by rank, 
military occupational specialty, branch of service, race, gender, religion, and political 
preferences, to name a few. Civil-military relations research currently does not account for sub-
groups or sub-cultures and the effect these groups might have on people’s opinions of the 
military.  
 I believe a sub-group of the military, which I call the warrior class, has a significant 
influence on people’s perceptions and stereotypes of the military. This sub-group of the military 
can be characterized by their overt sense of patriotism and moral superiority over the rest of 
society. The warrior class also displays great pride in their war service and hold dear the bonds 
of brotherhood forged in combat. Their heritage is rich in the sense that they come from a long 
line of family members who have served in the military. The warrior class chooses to make the 
military a career, serving in the combat arms branches, and seeks opportunities to serve in 
combat above and beyond other soldiers. 
 In this chapter, I created variables for the warrior class that can be used to measure other 
attitudes and perceptions of the military in extant civil-military relations literature. I did this by 
employing factor analysis using eight variables that characterize the warrior class. I used the 
principal-component factors method for my analysis, which assumes all variable communalities 
are one. I then applied an oblique rotation to the factor scores, which does not require factors to 
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be correlated. The results of my analysis show there are four unique dimensions or factors of the 
warrior class. 
 The four dimensions of the warrior class are Attitude, Warhood, Spartans, and 
Professional. The Attitude dimension is comprised of the Patriotic and Mora_Ethical variables. 
Warhood is comprised of Brotherhood and War_Pride variables. Longer_Combat and 
Combat_Arms variables encompass the Spartans dimension. Lastly, the Professional dimension 
consists of the Career_Oriented and Family_Trade variables. 
 Refined Definition of the Warrior Class. The warrior class is a sub-group within the 
U.S. military characterized by four unique dimensions inherent in this group. The first dimension 
consists of those who believe they are more patriotic and have higher moral and ethical values 
than the rest of society. The second dimension consists of those who have great pride in their war 
service and hold close the bonds of brotherhood forged in combat. The third dimension has spent 
more time in combat than any other soldier as members of the military’s combat arms specialties. 
The last dimension of the warrior class consists of those who choose to make the military a 
career and come from families where military service is a family tradition. 
 In the subsequent chapters, I use the warrior class variables created from my factor 
analysis to predict military perceptions and attitudes towards civilian society and political and 
policy attitudes relevant to civil-military relations.   
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Chapter 2: Warrior Class Attitudes of Civilian Sentiments: Is the Military Losing Touch 
with American Society? 
 




 This chapter uses variables created in Chapter One to gauge warrior class attitudes 
towards civilian sentiments regarding the U.S. military. The purpose is to identify attitudinal 
cleavages within the military that may have implications for civil-military relations. In other 
words, this chapter examines the military perspective of components to the gap thesis in civil-
military relations.  
The U.S. military has been an all-volunteer force since 1973, and surveys consistently 
rank them as the most trusted institution over other institutions such as Congress, courts, 
business, law, and academia. With the status of trustworthiness towards the military, perceptions 
of trust and pride coincide with those who serve and have served in the military. This perception 
of trust and pride may not always be reciprocal. Meaning, military members and veterans are not 
highly trusting of their civilian counterparts. After a decade of war, the military has been 
engaged in global operations and bears the burden of combat while the civilian population has 
ostensibly lost interest in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
It is common to hear the diatribes of service members about the lack of civilian empathy 
and support to the war efforts. With less than one percent of Americans serving in the military in 
the post 9/11 era, it is feared that the American people have lost touch with their military. 
Although military members may share this sentiment, the premise for this chapter suggests the 
opposite. It is the military that is losing touch with the American people. The all-volunteer, 
                                                
16 Passage comes from U.S. Army marching cadence used to motivate soldiers. Various sources available on the 
World Wide Web, however, original author is unknown. 
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incestuous and homogenous nature of the military has created a distinct warrior class that 
separates itself in everything from housing and education to values and ideology. This raises the 
important question of how a military organization once feared (Bacevich 1997; Holsti 1999; 
Gronke and Feaver 2001, 129) and misunderstood by the citizenry can require more recognition 
from the same citizenry that now respects them deeply (Ryan and Nenninger 1987). This chapter 
challenges the idea that Americans are losing touch with their military. I do this by measuring 
attitudes of the warrior class to their perceptions of civilian sentiments toward the military; 
sentiments that are otherwise considered a fond connection of society to their military. 
The former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Admiral Mike Mullen, 
perpetuated this sentiment in his 2011 graduation speech at the U.S. Military Academy. He 
described an American population that revered and appreciated the service of their military and 
even admitted that those who do not support the wars still support their military. However, his 
tone quickly changed as he further explained that Americans are losing touch with their military. 
He asserted: 
[But] I fear they don’t know us. I fear they do not comprehend the 
full weight of the burden we carry or the price we pay when we 
return from battle. This is important, because a people uninformed 
about what they are asking the military to endure is a people 
inevitably unable to fully grasp the scope of the responsibilities our 
Constitution levies upon them. Were we more representative of the 
population, were more American families touched by military 
service…perhaps a more advantageous familiarity would ensue 
(Mullen 2011). 
 
This sentiment may not be widely shared within the military. I suggest the civilian 
population is more in touch with the military than they have been in a long time while the 
military is losing touch with the American people. Mullen does not overtly categorize the 
military into a distinct warrior class. But the disparity between civilian and military sectors 
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within the U.S. population Mullen describes might suggest otherwise. A dominant sub-group 
within the force may project the perception the military has lost touch with the American people 
while other groups in the military may have different views. For example, certain dimensions of 
the warrior class may perpetuate this sentiment while individual members controlled by rank, 
age, education, race, or gender might not share this sentiment.  
The purpose of this chapter gauges the significance of warrior class attitudes and their 
perception of civilian sentiments toward the military. The overarching question this chapter 
seeks to explore is, is America losing touch with their military, or is the military losing touch 
with the American people? Answering this question is a daunting task given extant literature and 
available data. However, a more narrowed research question that examines attitudes of the 
warrior class may better identify military members’ sentiments toward the society they serve. 
Therefore, the focused question this chapter seeks to explore is, does the warrior class reject 
positive civilian sentiments toward the military and feel civilians are disconnected with their 
military? The importance of this topic not only seeks to understand how this once despised and 
misunderstood organization has reached a level where they can dismiss positive civilian 
sentiments towards the military, but it brings some light to the precarious nature of civil-military 
relations in the United States. 
I address this question in several parts. Using variables created from the warrior class 
dimensions in Chapter One, I first measure their attitudes towards civilian sentiments using three 
specific questions from the WAPO/KFF survey. These three questions are: 1) Do you think most 
Americans’ respect for the military is genuine, or do you think most Americans are just saying 
things they think people want to hear? 2) When you see a yellow ribbon honoring military 
service, does that make you feel good, or does it feel like more of an empty gesture? 3) Would 
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you say the average American does or does not appreciate your service in the (Iraq 
war/Afghanistan war/Iraq and Afghanistan wars)? Second, I gauge warrior class feelings of 
disconnection with civilian society using a fourth question from the survey. The question asks, In 
a few words, could you describe how the readjustment to civilian life was difficult for you? Last, 
I measure warrior class responses to these questions controlling for rank, age, race, education, 
religion, party affiliation, political ideology, and gender. 
Background 
 National holidays provide American’s the opportunity to reflect on the purpose of that 
special day. Anyone who chooses to reflect on the purpose of that day does so in his or her own 
way. Many people go “all out” by decorating their homes and offices to ensure those around 
them know how festive, supportive, or patriotic they are. The service and sacrifice of America’s 
veterans is commemorated in the month of November on Veteran’s Day. Undoubtedly, there is 
no shortage of “thanks” for our veterans on this holiday. Many cities host parades in honor of our 
veterans. Some stores host special Veteran’s Day sales. Meanwhile, many sporting venues give a 
special “salute” to veterans at some point during the event. The National Football League has 
even gone so far as to place stickers of military unit insignias on the helmets of their players in 
honor of veterans. However, respect and gratitude for the troops does not end after Veterans Day. 
The “support the troops” campaign seems to be a year-around phenomenon with the ubiquitous 
yellow ribbon bumper stickers, panning over soldiers in uniform at professional sporting events 
with a special “thanks to the troops” from the commentator, and the ingratiating permission for 
soldiers to board airplanes before other passengers. Many retail stores give military members 
special discounts even if it is not Veteran’s Day. America’s infatuation with its veterans has even 
gone so far as to confuse the purpose of two other national holidays, Memorial Day and 
 47 
Independence Day, as another reason to idolize living service members and veterans.17 This 
borderline jingoistic adoration for America’s troops poses a problem for those who study 
American civil-military relations, specifically the culture gap thesis which assumes a deep 
cultural divide between civilians and members of the military. It is a problem because respect for 
the military seems to be a sensitive subject, and is generally ignored in extant civil-military 
relations gap literature. 
 With such recognition and respect towards the military, how could one infer a gap 
between the military and civil society, let alone an estrangement of society from their military (or 
vice versa)? Journalist Thomas Ricks identified a growing cultural gap between the military and 
the rest of society in a 1997 essay published in The Atlantic Monthly. Ricks postulated that our 
military is no longer representative of the society it serves and suggested, “[I]t now appears not 
only possible but likely that over the next twenty years the U.S. military will revert to a kind of 
garrison status, largely self-contained and increasingly distinct as a society and subculture (Ricks 
1997b, 69; see also Szayna, et al. 2007, 3).” Ricks’ 1997 omen is reminiscent of the current civil-
military relations environment. Ricks followed and interviewed members of a Marine Corps 
basic training unit to support his thesis. The comments he captured from the marines he 
interviewed in 1997 are applicable today.  
 Referring to a gathering with old high school friends, Ricks quoted a new Marine Boot 
Camp graduate with disdain for his old friends. “’They’re not going anywhere, and I don’t want 
to be around them…[W]e don’t have any common ground (Ricks 1997b, 67).’” Another marine 
recalled his experience with civilians post-boot camp at a fair near his hometown stating, “’[I]t 
was crowded. Trash everywhere…[P]eople [civilians] with obnoxious attitudes, no politeness 
                                                
17 Memorial Day is to honor those service members who have made the final sacrifice in service of their country. 
Independence Day is to commemorate America’s declaration of independence from England. 
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whatsoever. I didn’t let it get to me. This is the way civilian life is: nasty (Ricks 1997b, 67).’” 
The sentiments of Ricks’ interviewees are not exclusive to the Marine Corps, but may be 
representative of the warrior class.  
Journalist Andrew Bacevich (1997) made a similar observation of the changing American 
culture vis-à-vis the traditional military ethos. Bacevich attributed growing civil-military 
tensions to the “growing isolation of the military” and “a belief among some soldiers that they 
represent a morally superior remnant in an otherwise decadent society (Bacevich 1997, 19).” In 
essence, a growing contempt by the military for society is occurring (Ricks 1997b; Cohn 1999; 
Holsti 2001). Seemingly, Admiral Mullen’s fear that Americans are losing touch with their 
military may be the exact opposite; the military is losing touch with the American people, and 
this is fomented by the military’s growing contempt and feeling of moral superiority over civil 
society. 
 Based on the assumed growing contempt and feeling of moral superiority, I hypothesize 
in the next section the military will reject many positive civilian sentiments toward the military. 
These sentiments may otherwise be interpreted as attitudes of faith and confidence in the military 
institution that embody a sense of “connectedness” between the American people and their 
military. 
Hypothesis 
 The gap thesis in civil-military relations assumes mutual skepticism between civilians 
and the military institution (Gronke and Feaver 2001). Much of this skepticism is perpetuated by 
the military’s “perceived moral decay in civilian society” and the military’s belief that they are 
“morally superior to the civilian society it is protecting (Gronke and Feaver 2001, 147; see Ricks 
1997b; Holsti 1999; Bacevich 1997).” This theory of mutual skepticism is not new to U.S. civil-
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military relations and dates back to the time of the American Revolution (Weigley 2001). 
Historian Russell Weigley (2001) suggested that regular (professional) army soldiers in the new 
Republic considered themselves as occupiers of a somewhat hostile environment that bred 
distrust by American civilians. This distrust was reciprocated as Weigley noted, “soldiers 
reciprocated civilian distrust with ill feeling of their own, often fortified by their sense that they 
themselves represented an ethos of discipline and manly virtue superior to the easygoing values 
of civilian society (Weigley 2001, 215).” 
 The current environment in civil-military relations suggests an over “sentamentalization” 
of the military by civil society; ostensibly, as a way of “making amends for the reckless 
demonization of American soldiers during and after the Vietnam War (Bacevich 1997, 21; see 
Bacevich 2005).” The ubiquitous “support the troops” campaigns and yellow ribbon displays are 
just examples of this “sentimentalization” towards the military. These gestures might indicate 
civilians are more familiar and connected with their military than previously assumed (Gronke 
and Feaver 2001). 
 However, I suggest the warrior class rejects this “sentimentalization” and overt respect 
for the military as remnants of mutual skepticism, the military’s contempt for civil society, and 
their self-perception of moral superiority. Paul Gronke and Peter Feaver (2001) considered this 
opposite dynamic from a civilian perspective: 
[P]erhaps familiarity breeds contempt, so that support for the 
military actually grows as people lose any personal awareness of 
how alien military culture is to the classical liberal American way 
of life. Or perhaps social distance from the military permits shallow 
and superficial support, the kind that results in affirmative answers 
to easy questions but masks a deeper alienation that could quickly 
come to the fore…(Gronke and Feaver 2001, 130). 
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Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that military members might share this perspective and reject 
civilian respect and positive sentiments towards the military. 
 Hypothesis: The warrior class will reject positive civilian attitudes and sentiments 
towards the military and feel a disconnection with civilian society. 
Data and Methods 
 To test this hypothesis, I use the same data from the previous chapter and the warrior 
class variables created from that data. The data comes from a March 2014 survey of post-9/11 
combat veterans conducted by The Washington Post and Kaiser Family Foundation titled, 
“Survey of Iraq and Afghanistan Active Duty Soldiers Veterans.” The survey was conducted 
between August 1 and December 15, 2013 and received 819 responses from adults who served in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, or both. Unfortunately, the survey only queried active military and veterans 
and did not collect responses from a civilian population. Civilian data collected in the same 
survey would be useful to compare military and civilian attitudes as they relate to my 
dissertation. However, my objective is to gauge warrior class attitudes as they relate to perceived 
civilian sentiments towards the military.  
 Dependent Variables. I use four dependent variables to test my hypothesis. The first 
three dependent variables represent military attitudes towards positive civilian sentiments for the 
military. The fourth dependent variable represents military feelings of “connectedness” with 
civilian society. 
Disingenuous is the first dependent variable, which gauges whether the military believes 
civilian respect is genuine or not. I operationalize this variable using a question from the 
WAPO/KFF survey. The specific question asks, “Do you think most Americans’ respect for the 
military is genuine, or do you think most Americans are just saying things they think people 
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want to hear?” Possible responses are 1) “Most Americans’ respect for the military is genuine” 
(56.4%), 2) “Most Americans are just saying things they think people want to hear” (38.6%), 3) 
“Don’t think people DO respect the military” (.5%), and 8/9) “Don’t know/Refused” (4.5%). I 
create a dummy variable for Disingenuous, coding 1 as 0 (56.3%), 2 and 3 as 1 (39.3%), and 
drop 8/9 (4.5%). 
 The second dependent variable is Empty Gesture. This variable measures military 
attitudes toward yellow ribbon displays. Using a question from the same survey, the question 
asks, “When you see a yellow ribbon honoring military service, does that make you feel good, or 
does it feel like more of an empty gesture?” Possible responses are 1) “Makes you feel good” 
(70.8%), 2) “Feels like more of an empty gesture” (21.4%), 3) “Neither” (5.5%), and 8/9) “Don’t 
know/Refused” (2.3%). I also create a dummy variable for Empty Gesture, coding 1 and 3 as 0 
(76.3%), 2 as 1 (21.3%), and drop 8/9 (2%). 
 The third dependent variable is No Appreciation. This variable measures combat 
veterans’ perception of Americans’ appreciation for their combat service. The question I use 
from the survey asks, “Would you say the average American does or does not appreciate your 
service in the Iraq and/or Afghanistan war(s)?” Responses are 1) “Yes, does appreciate” (72.6%), 
2) “No, does not appreciate” (21.2%), and 8/9) “Don’t know/Refused” (6.1%). I keep No 
Appreciation as a dummy variable, coding 1 as 0, 2 as 1, but drop 8/9. 
 The last dependent variable I use is Disconnection. This variable gauges military feelings 
regarding integration with civilian society. The survey question I use to operationalize this 
variable asks, “In a few words, could you describe how the readjustment to civilian life was 
difficult for you?” This question is a response to the previous question in the survey which asks, 
“After your active duty military service, would you say your re-adjustment to civilian life was 
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very easy, somewhat easy, somewhat difficult or very difficult?” Keep in mind, the survey 
consists of 819 responses. Only 231 respondents were on active duty when they took the survey.  
 The question I use has 44 possible responses. Respondents had 10 chances to answer this 
question, checking only one response each time. I use eight of the 44 responses to operationalize 
Disconnection. The responses are, “Being around crowds” (.62%), “Civilians not understanding 
veterans (what they’ve been through/what they’re going through, stereotyping, etc.)” (1.5%), 
“Being around civilians that don’t share the same morals/ethics (are lazy, unfocused, negative, 
ignorant, lack discipline)” (1.75%), “Being around civilians/dealing with people in general” 
(1%), “Other being around others/civilians mentions (sic)” (.75%), and “Lack of 
structure/civilian life is less structured” (1.5%). These percentages are an aggregate of the 10 
chances to respond to the question. Disconnection is a dummy variable where I code the eight 
responses as 1 (8.12%) and all other responses and missing values as 0 (91.88%). I code missing 
values as 0 to account for respondents who were on active duty at the time of the survey and 
those who did not respond all 10 times.18 
 Independent Variables. The four dimensions or factors of the warrior class derived from 
factor analysis in Chapter One are the independent variables I use in this chapter. These variables 
are Attitude, Warhood, Spartans, and Professional. Since I created these variables from factor 
analysis, each is continuous variable. Likewise, I used the principal-component factors method to 
extract the factors, which holds all communalities at one. This means the standard deviation for 
each variable is one. The summary statistics for each independent variable are as follows: 
Attitude: Mean = 5.47e-10. Minimum = -2.497. Maximum = 1.392. N = 691. 
Warhood: Mean = 0. Minimum = -2.751. Maximum = 2.131. N = 691. 
                                                
18 I conducted two logistic regressions using Disconnection as the DV coding missing values as 0 and missing 
values as dropped. Both regressions yielded near identical results except the N changes significantly when missing 
values are dropped. 
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Spartans: Mean = 1.09e-09. Minimum = -1.465. Maximum = 1.919. N = 691. 
Professional: Mean = -2.52e-09. Minimum = -1.632. Maximum = 2.266. N = 691. 
 Remember from Chapter One, the factor analysis was conducted using eight variables. 
These variables are Patriotic, Moral_Ethical, Career_Oriented, Longer_Combat, Combat_Arms, 
Brotherhood, War_Pride, and Family_Trade. The Attitude variable is comprised of Patriotic and 
Moral_Ethical. Brotherhood and War_Pride account for the Warhood variable. Spartans is 
comprised of Longer_Combat and Combat_Arms, while the Professional variable is comprised 
of Career_Oriented and Family_Trade. 
 Control Variables. I include eight control variables in my analysis: Rank, Race, Age, 
Education, Christian, Republican, Political Ideology, and Male. Rank is an ordinal variable but 
broken down by enlisted (1), non-commissioned officers (2), warrant officers (3), and 
commissioned officers (4) instead of by individual rank (Private to General). Race is a 
categorical variable where “other” is coded as 0, Asian, Native American, Native 
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander as 1, blacks as 2 and whites as 3. Age is an ordinal variable ranging 
from 18 to 77 years old. Education is also an ordinal variable that ranges from “less than high 
school graduate” to “graduate school or more.” Christian is a dummy variable I create from a 
demographic question asking one’s religion. Nineteen different religions were offered as 
responses. I code all the Christian religions as 1 and 0 for all others. Christians make up the 
majority of all military members and discussed widely in much of the civil-military relations 
literature (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1971; Holsti 2001). Likewise, much of the civil-military 
literature discusses the preponderance of military members who identify with the Republican 
Party and lean more conservative in political ideology (Bacevich and Kohn 1997; Huntington 
1957; Holsti 2001; Dempsey 2010). Thus, I create the Republican variable as a dummy variable, 
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but I keep Political Ideology as a categorical variable ranging from very liberal (1) to very 
conservative (5). Political Ideology is labeled “Political Ideology^Conservative” for use in tables 
throughout this chapter.  
 I conduct four separate ordinary least-squares regressions using the control variables as 
independent variables in order to describe the relationship between control variables and each 
warrior class dimension. Table 2 below shows the results of all four regressions. In the first 
column where Attitude is the dependent variable, Age, Republican, and Whites are statistically 
significant predictors for the Attitude dimension of the warrior class. Age and Republican have a 
strong, positive correlation with Attitude. Whites, on the other hand, have a strong, negative 
relationship with the Attitude dimension. Keep in mind, the Attitude factor is comprised of 
military members who believe they are more patriotic and have better moral and ethical values 
than the rest of civil society.  
 Under the Warhood column, Rank, Age, and Male have a statistically significant 
relationship with the Warhood dimension. Rank and Male have a strong, positive relationship 
while Age has a strong, negative relationship with that dimension of the warrior class. Warhood 
dimension is comprised of Brotherhood and War_Pride variables in which respondents primarily 
missed the brotherhood and camaraderie they felt during their time in Iraq and/or Afghanistan 
and felt great pride in their war service.  
 The third column of Table 2 below shows Rank, Education, and Male are statistically 
significant predictors of the Spartan dimension. Rank and Male have a positive relationship with 
this dimension while Education has a negative relationship. The Spartan dimension is comprised 
of the Longer_Combat and Combat_Arms variables, where military respondents are members of 
the combat arms branches and spent a year or more in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  
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 Lastly, the Professional dimension (below in the fourth column) has only one statistically 
significant predictor, Political Ideology. Career_Oriented and Family_Trade variables are the 
components of the Professional dimension. This dimension is comprised of service members 
who intended to make the military a career when they enlisted and have a mother and/or father 
and a grandparent who served in the military. Political Ideology has a strong, positive 
relationship with the Professional dimension (1=very liberal, 5=very conservative). 
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Table 2: Warrior Class Dimensions with Control Variables 
 

























































































































































































Note: Ordinary Least-squares regression.  Standard errors are in parentheses. The Dependent variables are the warrior class 
dimensions in bold at the top of each column. **p<.05; Data is from August 1 to 15 December, 2013 The Washington Post and 




 I first test my hypothesis using logistic regression with the Disingenuous dependent 
variable. As seen below in the first model of Table 3, Spartans is the only dimension of the 
warrior class that is statistically significant and more likely to believe that civilians’ respect for 
the military is not genuine. However, none of the warrior class variables are statistically 
significant after I apply control variables in model two. Instead, Republicans and Political 
Ideology (more conservative) become statistically significant, albeit less likely to believe 
civilians’ respect for the military is disingenuous.  
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Table 3: Perceived Warrior Class Attitudes Towards Civilian Respect for Military 
 
DV = Disingenuous (Respect for the military is disingenuous) 
Independent Variables 
Model 1 
(Warrior Class Only) 
Model 2 

























































































































Note: Logistic regression.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  The Dependent variable is Disingenuous. Actual survey question: 
“Do you think most Americans’ respect for the military is genuine, or do you think most Americans are just saying things they 
think people want to hear?” **p<.05; Data is from August 1 to 15 December, 2013 The Washington Post and Kaiser Family 
Foundation Survey of Iraq and Afghanistan Active Duty Soldiers and Veterans. Independent variables in bold are dimensions of 




Using the Disingenuous dependent variable does little to support my hypothesis that the 
warrior class is more likely to reject positive civilian attitudes and sentiments towards the 
military. However, considering the statistical significance of Republican and Political Ideology 
in model two, it does lend some credence to Andrew Bacevich’s observation that, “[I]n public 
life today, paying homage to those in uniform has become obligatory and the one unforgiveable 
sin is to be found guilty of failing to ‘support the troops.’ In the realm of partisan politics, the 
political Right has shown considerable skill in exploiting this dynamic, shamelessly pandering to 
the military itself…(Bacevich 2005, 24).” 
 Next, I use logistic regression to test my hypothesis with the Empty Gesture dependent 
variable and find similar results. Table 4 below shows the Attitude dimension of the warrior class 
is statistically significant in model one and remains significant adding control variables in model 
two. However, this component of the warrior class is less likely to feel yellow ribbon displays 
are empty gestures. Christians in the military are also less likely to consider yellow ribbon 
displays as empty gestures as seen below in model two. 
The Empty Gesture dependent variable also does little to support my hypothesis that the 
warrior class is more likely to reject positive civilian attitudes and sentiments towards the 
military. A possible explanation for this finding might be the wording of the survey question I 
use to operationalize this dependent variable. The survey question did not specify the source of 
yellow ribbon displays. It seems reasonable that military personnel or their family members are 
the likely source of yellow ribbon displays in the context of the given survey question. 
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Table 4: Perceived Warrior Class Attitudes Towards Yellow Ribbon Display 
 
DV = Empty Gesture (Warrior Class feels yellow ribbon displays are empty gestures) 
Independent Variables 
Model 1 
(Warrior Class Only) 
Model 2 

























































































































Note: Logistic regression.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  The Dependent variable is Empty Gesture. Actual survey question: 
“When you see a yellow ribbon honoring military service, does that make you feel good, or does it feel like more of an empty 
gesture?” **p<.05; Data is from August 1 to 15 December, 2013 The Washington Post and Kaiser Family Foundation Survey of 
Iraq and Afghanistan Active Duty Soldiers and Veterans. Independent variables in bold are dimensions of the Warrior Class.  
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I then test my hypothesis using logistic regression with the No Appreciation dependent 
variable. Once again, the Spartans dimension appears to be statistically significant without 
applying control variables, but not significant when control variables are applied (see Table 5 
below). Spartans are more likely to think the average American does not appreciate their war 
service without the application of control variables. When control variables are applied to the 
regression model (model two), none of the dimensions of the warrior class are statistically 
significant. Rank, on the other hand, is statistically significant. However, those of higher rank are 
less likely to think the average American does not appreciate their combat service. 
 On one hand, the No Appreciation variable does little to support my hypothesis. On the 
other, this may be expected of the warrior class. Steven Pressfield (2011) goes into great detail 
about the virtues and ethos of warrior cultures. He highlights such virtues as sacrifice, 
selflessness and duty, honor, country. These virtues are written into a warrior code and enjoyed 
only among warriors. Pressfield writes, “[T]he language of the Warrior Ethos is private. It speaks 
warrior to warrior and doesn’t care if outsiders get it or not (Pressfield 2011, 64).” No 
recognition or appreciation from the “average American” is required. A warrior’s reward for 
their combat service is honor. For the true warrior, “honor is a man’s most prized possession. 
Without it, life is not worth living (Pressfield 2011, 53).” 
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Table 5: Warrior Class Perception of Civilian Appreciation for War Service 
 
DV = No Appreciation (Warrior Class feels civilians do not appreciate their war service) 
Independent Variables 
Model 1 
(Warrior Class Only) 
Model 2 

























































































































Note: Logistic regression.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  The Dependent variable is No Appreciation. Actual survey 
question: “Would you say the average American does or does not appreciate your service in the Iraq and/or Afghanistan war(s)?” 
**p<.05; Data is from August 1 to 15 December, 2013 The Washington Post and Kaiser Family Foundation Survey of Iraq and 
Afghanistan Active Duty Soldiers and Veterans. Independent variables in bold are dimensions of the Warrior Class. 
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 Finally, I test my hypothesis with the Disconnection dependent variable using logistic 
regression. As seen below in Table 6, I conduct two regressions with just the warrior class 
variables in model one and apply control variables in model two. Warhood is the only variable 
that is statistically significant in both models. The positive coefficients for Warhood suggest this 
dimension of the warrior class is likely to feel a disconnection with civilian society.  
 These findings support the second part of my hypothesis but do little to support the idea 
that the warrior class will reject positive civilian attitudes and sentiments towards the military. 
The idea the warrior class will reject such positive sentiments serves as an indicator of such 
disconnectedness and the military losing touch with the society it serves. The first three analyses 
do little to support this idea. However, the analysis results in Table 6 do support the idea that part 
of the military may be losing touch with the rest of society because the Warhood dimension is 
more likely to feel disconnected with civilian society.  
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Table 6: Warrior Class Feelings of Civilian Disconnection 
 
DV = Disconnection (feelings toward civilian society) 
Independent Variables 
Model 1 
(Warrior Class Only) 
Model 2 

























































































































Note: Logistic regression.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  The Dependent variable is Disconnection. Actual survey question: 
“In a few words, could you describe how the readjustment to civilian life was difficult for you?” **p<.05; Data is from August 1 
to 15 December, 2013 The Washington Post and Kaiser Family Foundation Survey of Iraq and Afghanistan Active Duty Soldiers 




 This chapter was an attempt to analyze pervasive discussions in civil-military gap 
literature by using the warrior class variables created in Chapter One. Growing contempt of the 
military towards civilians, mutual skepticism and distrust, and the incongruence of civilian and 
military cultures are examples of these discussions. I hypothesized that these attitudes are an 
indication that the warrior class is likely to reject positive civilian attitudes towards the military 
and feel a disconnection with civilian society. Parts of my analysis and findings tell a different 
story; the exact opposite of what I expected.  
 I tested my hypothesis using logistic regression with four different dependent variables 
and the warrior class dimensions as independent variables. The first three dependent variables 
served as positive civilian sentiments towards the military. The results of my analyses using 
these dependent variables suggest the opposite of what I predicted; the warrior class did not 
reject positive civilian sentiments towards the military. 
 Perhaps my interpretation of the literature is wrong. Perhaps the military’s self-perception 
of moral superiority and contempt for civilian society are not adequate indicators that the warrior 
class will reject positive civilian sentiments and attitudes towards the military. Or perhaps the 
warrior class and the rest of the military are starting to believe their own hype. If this is the case, 
I should change my position and hypothesize the warrior class is more likely to embrace positive 
civilian sentiments towards the military. Thus, my analysis and findings in this chapter are spot 
on and the military may not be losing touch with American society. 
 However, the results of my analysis using the Disconnection dependent variable suggests 
the warrior class does feel a disconnection with civilian society, albeit only one dimension of the 
warrior class: Warhood. This dimension is comprised of the Brotherhood and War_Pride 
variables. These members of the warrior class primarily missed the brotherhood and camaraderie 
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they felt during their time in Iraq and Afghanistan and felt great pride in their war service. While 
these bonds and prideful feelings can last a lifetime, it seems reasonable this dimension might 
struggle at reintegrating back into the civilian world and feel a disconnection with the people 
they served. 
Regardless, one of the objectives for this chapter was to use my measure of warrior class 
from Chapter One to predict military attitudes relevant to civil-military relations. The dimensions 
of the warrior class and variables created for it are sound; they reveal a distinction of attitudes for 
sub-groups or sub-cultures within the military. I can use these warrior class variables to further 
predict political and policy attitudes relevant to civil-military relations in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Warrior Class Political Preferences 
 
Politics is beyond the scope of military competence… 
-Samuel Huntington (1957) 
 
 I examine political attitudes of the warrior class in this chapter. I use the same warrior 
class variables created in Chapter One and control variables created in Chapter Two to measure 
long-standing assumptions in civil-military relations literature that military members are mostly 
conservative in political ideology and Republican in their partisan preferences (Ricks 1997b; 
Ricks 1997a; Huntington 1957; Moskos 1976; Karsten 1971; Moskos 1979; Janowitz 1971). I 
then measure warrior class attitudes towards the only two Presidents who served as Commander-
in-Chief (CINC) of the military in the post-9/11 era. The purpose of this chapter tests and 
determines if the warrior class deviates from past assumptions regarding military political 
preferences.  
 The U.S. military has traditionally been viewed as apolitical and non-partisan in their 
political attitudes and beliefs. Many scholars have postulated this dictum for the proper 
functioning of the military and the their relationship with civilian policymakers. Samuel 
Huntington (1957) went into great detail describing the “military mind” where the “ideal military 
man” should be “conservative in strategy, but open-minded and progressive with respect to new 
weapons and new tactical forms (Huntington 1957, 71).” Much of the extant literature targets 
military officers and the military elite with these assumptions. Huntington declared this point 
several decades ago: 
Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the 
participation of military officers in politics undermines their 
professionalism, curtailing their professional competence, dividing 
the profession against itself, and substituting extraneous values for 
professional values. The military officer must remain neutral 
politically (Huntington 1957, 71). 
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However, Huntington held firm to the idea that the “ideal military man” is foremost both realistic 
and conservative (Huntington 1957, 79). 
 Morris Janowitz disagreed with Huntington in many respects regarding civil-military 
relations, but agreed with him on this particular subject. In similar fashion, Janowitz claimed, 
“the professional soldier is ‘above politics’ in domestic affairs” and military traditions “have 
worked to enforce an essential absence of political partisanship (Janowitz 1971, 233).” Janowitz 
assumed the political beliefs of the military were not distinct but rather a “refraction of civilian 
society (Janowitz 1971, 234).” Janowitz believed that political attitudes of military people 
mirrored that of civil society because the military was drafted or recruited from the American 
population.19 However, war, military education and training, and military experience over the 
length of one’s professional career supposedly changes the “political thinking” of military 
professionals, especially the elite (high-ranking officers) (Janowitz 1971, 234-5). Although 
Janowitz assumed the “vast majority of officers are primarily concerned with purely professional 
and technical matter,” he also assumed that as “they [officers] ascend in the hierarchy, they 
become increasingly conscious of their political loyalties and preferences (Janowitz 1971, 234).” 
 Famous military elites from wars past have held true to the apolitical and non-partisan 
tradition. General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff during World War II, was rather 
overt about his apolitical attitude. He never voted in any election while on active duty and made 
a point of letting others know that voting was “inconsistent with officership (Bacevich and Kohn 
1997).” He went on to two high profile cabinet posts after he retired from the military, Secretary 
of State and Secretary of Defense. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was also apolitical while in 
uniform but ran for president after he retired (Bacevich and Kohn 1997). On the other hand, 
                                                
19 Morris Janowitz’s “The Professional Soldier” was published in 1971 before the inception of the all-volunteer 
force. 
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General Douglas MacArthur was rather vocal about his policy differences with President Truman 
during the Korean War and addressed a joint session of Congress about his differences while still 
on active duty.  
 While early civil-military relations theorists professed the apolitical, albeit conservative 
minded nature of the military, later scholars observed the military as overly conservative in 
political ideology and Republican leaning in party preference (Ricks 1997a; Holsti 1999; 
Bacevich and Kohn 1997; Holsti 2001). Ostensibly, the early military theorists were referring to 
a different meaning of the label “conservative.” Janowitz (1971) made this distinction noting: 
In its most general political usage, conservatism supports the belief 
in the moral desirability of maintaining the status quo. But in the 
military context, political conservatism must be reconciled with a 
preoccupation with technological change and, by implication, with 
change in other spheres of human behavior. Conservatism also 
implies that human nature is not highly perfectible. To the 
professional soldier, this aspect of conservatism asserts that 
violence is the final arbiter of human relations, and that, in fact, 
resort to violence is inevitable (Janowitz 1971, 242). 
 
Over two decades later, journalist Thomas Ricks clarified the meaning of military conservatism 
(or conservatives in the military), noting the increased trend of young military officers openly 
identifying as “hard-right Republican (Ricks 1997b, 72; Ricks 1997a, 280-1).”  
 In 1997, Ricks’ book, Making the Corps, was published the same month as his essay 
identifying a widening gap between the military and society in The Atlantic Monthly. His 
subjects in Making the Corps were the very same warrior class Marines discussed in Chapter 
Two of this dissertation. The military members who identified a moral decay in civilian society 
and adopted a growing contempt for civilians are the same members Ricks (1997a,b) observed as 
“hard-right Republicans.” 
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 The question this chapter seeks to investigate is, does the warrior class identify more with 
the Republican Party and conservative political ideology? Likewise, does the warrior class 
prefer President Bush to President Obama as  Commander-in-Chief of the military? The answer 
to this question is important for civil-military relations research because it speaks to my 
overarching assumption that dominant sub-cultures in the military may be casting attitudes, 
perceptions, and beliefs that represent and stereotype the military as a whole. I address these 
questions as follows: first, I review extant empirical research gauging the military’s political 
ideology and party preferences. Second, I examine the political affiliation of the warrior class. 
Third, I explore the political ideology of the warrior class. Finally, I measure warrior class 
attitudes towards the Commanders-in-Chief of the military in the post-9/11 era.  
Military Partisanship and Political Ideology 
 Morris Janowitz (1971) was one of the first civil-military scholars to attempt any 
quantitative determination of military members’ political orientation. To do this, Janowitz used a 
1954 questionnaire given to 576 Army, Navy, and Air Force officers working on various military 
staffs at the Pentagon.20 The questionnaire specifically asked, “In domestic politics, do you 
regard yourself as: conservative, a little on the conservative side, a little on the liberal side, 
liberal (Janowitz 1971, 236, 238)?”  
 Of the 576 responses, 25.1% of Army officers identified as conservative and 44.5% 
somewhat conservative compared to 20.8% who identified as somewhat liberal and 5.3% liberal. 
Naval officers identified 23% conservative, 45.2% somewhat conservative, 18.3% somewhat 
liberal, and 6.3% liberal. Air Force officers identified 14.7% conservative, 46.2% somewhat 
                                                
20 From the Methodological Appendix: “In July 1954 Professors John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, by 
means of an extensive self-administered questionnaire, collected a variety of data on military education of the armed 
forces from a sample of officers assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and each of the 
three services (Janowitz 1971, 449).” 
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conservative, 31.8% somewhat liberal, and 3.2% liberal.21 Janowitz’s (1971) findings are 
noteworthy because it shows military officers’ aversion to identify on the far left or right but 
rather in the middle “somewhat” range.22 Janowitz assumed, however, that military officers 
identify themselves as conservatives or somewhat conservative only because “such an 
identification permits political perspectives without violation [of the officer tradition] of 
nonpartisanship (Janowitz 1971, 236).”  
 These findings are consistent with the WAPO/KFF survey of Iraq and Afghanistan 
veterans I use for this dissertation. This survey asks a similar question of one’s political views. 
Responses were 11.4% very conservative, 31.9% somewhat conservative, 30.5% moderate, 
14.8% somewhat liberal, and 4.4% very liberal. Prima facie, modern day combat veterans from 
Iraq and Afghanistan are more inclined to identify towards the middle and “somewhat” side of 
the ideological spectrum, much like military members in 1954 who most likely saw combat in 
Korea or World War II.  
 In the late 1990s, well after the advent of the all-volunteer force, two seminal studies 
focused on empirically measuring Ricks’ 1997 claim of a widening gap between the military and 
society. Ole R. Holsti and James Rosenau initiated the first study where they conducted a series 
of surveys in four-year intervals between 1976 and 1996. Their surveys, titled the “Foreign 
Policy Leadership Project” (FPLP), focused on civilian and military elites and asked opinion 
questions regarding foreign policy, national security, as well as political attitudes and party 
preferences. Using data from the FPLP, Holsti (1999) found the percent of military officers who 
identified as Republicans nearly doubled between 1976 and 1996, whereas civilian Republicans 
                                                
21 Questionnaire results found in Table 28 (Janowitz 1971, 237). 
22 Huntington, Janowitz, and other scholars of the same era mostly address political attitudes of military officers. 
The pre all-volunteer force was structured to maintain a professional officer corps and a small cadre of non-
commissioned officers and would recruit or draft American men to fill the enlisted ranks during war time or draw 
from the military Reserves (Moskos 1976; Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1971). 
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only increased slightly. For example, 33% of military officers surveyed in 1976 identified 
themselves as Republican compared to 67% in 1996, while 25% of civilians surveyed identified 
as Republican in 1976 and 34% in 1996 (Holsti 1999, 11). The change in military Democrats 
between 1976 (12%) and 1996 (7%) is not nearly as drastic as the spike in military Republicans 
between the two years, but showed a rate of decline higher than their civilian counterparts who 
identified 42% Democrat in 1976 and 41% in 1996 (Holsti 1999, 11).  Furthermore, Holsti 
(1999, 11) found over half the percentage of military Independents decreased between 1976 
(46%) and 1996 (22%). 
 The FPLP used a five-point scale (1=very liberal, 2=somewhat liberal, 3=moderate, 
4=somewhat conservative 5=very conservative) to determine political ideology. Military officers 
surveyed in 1976 identified 2% very liberal, 14% somewhat liberal, 23% moderate, 49% 
somewhat conservative, and 12% very conservative. In 1996, 0% identified as very liberal, 3% 
somewhat liberal, 25% moderate, 63% somewhat conservative, and 10% very conservative. 
Military officers who identified as somewhat liberal or somewhat conservative showed a 
significant shift between 1976 and 1996 (Holsti 1999, 13). Although the same military officers 
were not queried for all six surveys between 1976 and 1996, their inclination to identify in the 
middle or somewhat conservative supports Janowitz’s (1971) assumption that military officers 
identify in the middle or (somewhat) conservative in order to appear nonpartisan.  
 Peter D. Fever and Richard H. Kohn with the Triangle Institute for Security Studies 
(TISS) conducted the second seminal study. Their study consisted of a survey conducted 
between 1998 and 1999 titled “Survey on the Military in the Post-Cold War Era.”23 The TISS 
survey resembled the FPLP by surveying military and civilian elites and asked questions 
                                                
23 Referred to as TISS or TISS survey throughout dissertation. 
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concerning policy attitudes, political identification, and ideology. However, the TISS was more 
robust because it also queried mid-level leaders from both the civilian and military sectors, 
whereas the FPLP focused primarily on sector elites (Feaver, et al. 2001a).  
 Like the FPLP’s 1996 survey, the TISS found a majority of military members identified 
with the Republican Party (56.3%), but only 14.7% identified with the Democrat Party. Also like 
the 1996 FPLP survey, military members identified 20.4% Independent in the TISS survey. See 
Appendix A for tabulation and computation of percentages. Unlike the FPLP, the TISS used a 
seven-point scale ranging from “Far Left” to “Far Right” to determine respondent’s political 
ideology. The results from the TISS were very similar to the FPLP. 60.8% of military 
respondents identified as somewhat conservative, very conservative, or far left and 25.5% 
identified as moderates. In contrast, 10.2% of military members identified as somewhat liberal, 
very liberal, or far left in the TISS survey. The 1996 FPLP survey showed military members 
identified 0% very liberal and only 3% somewhat liberal. Appendix B has a full breakdown of 
the numbers and percentages for each category on the TISS’s seven-point ideology scale.  
 More recent research (post-9/11) paints a different picture of military members’ 
partisanship and political ideology. Of note is Jason Dempsey’s 2010 book, Our Army. Dempsey 
(2010) conducted a survey of over 1100 members of the U.S. Army in 2004. The survey is titled, 
“Citizenship and Service (C&S).” Respondents consisted of the enlisted, warrant officer, and 
officer ranks. Dempsey found 38% of the Army identified as conservative, 41% moderate, and 
21% liberal (Dempsey 2010, 74). Part of Dempsey’s (2010) conclusion was that members of the 
Army identified ideologically at similar, if not equal, rates as their civilian counterparts. 
Dempsey compared his 2004 C&S data to the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey 
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(NAES) and found civilians identified 37% conservative, 39% moderate, and 24% liberal 
(Dempsey 2010, 74). 
 Dempsey’s (2010) findings are not representative of the military as a whole. Note that he 
only surveyed members of the Army, and did not survey members of the Air Force, Navy, or 
Marine Corps. However, Dempsey broke his data down by rank where 63% of officers and 69% 
of warrant officers identified as conservative compared to only 32% of enlisted ranks (Dempsey 
2010, 75). Officers and warrant officers in the C&S survey identified as conservative at near 
equal rates as officers who responded in the 1996 FPLP survey where 63% identified as 
somewhat conservative and 10% very conservative (Holsti 1999, 13). Unfortunately, Dempsey 
(2010) did not query respondents of their partisan preferences. Instead, he created an algorithm 
that predicted party affiliation based on a number of other questions asked in the C&S survey. 
Dempsey’s algorithm predicted 67% of mid and senior field-grade officers (lieutenant colonels 
and colonels) would identify with the Republican Party while less than 40% of all the enlisted 
ranks would identify as Republican (Dempsey 2010, 95-105). 
 Another source of military partisan preferences and ideology comes from the Military 
Times, which conducts an annual survey asking these particular questions. The last survey posted 
on their website was conducted in 2012. Of the active duty service members of all ranks who 
participated in the survey, 6.8% identified as very conservative, 38.9% conservative, 37% 
moderate, 6.7% liberal, and 1.4% very liberal. Likewise, 43.8% identified as Republican, 27.9% 
Independent, and 9.7% Democrat ("Military Times Poll"  2012). These numbers are closer to 
Dempsey’s (2010) research than the FPLP or TISS. However, the Military Times survey is not a 
representative sample of the entire military. This survey only collects responses from subscribers 
of the Military Times, Army Times, Navy Times, and the Air Force Times. 
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Hypotheses 
 I make certain predictions regarding the warrior class’ party preferences and political 
ideology based on the research and surveys noted above. Dempsey’s (2010) research and the 
Military Times 2012 survey show that officers are more likely to affiliate with the Republican 
Party and identify as conservatives than enlisted ranks. The FPLP shows similar results for 
officers but no prediction for enlisted ranks because the project’s surveys only queried officers. 
The TISS shows military members, as a whole, are more likely to affiliate with the Republican 
Party than Democratic Party and lean more conservative than liberal. However, the warrior class 
is comprised of all ranks from all the military services. I use the above-mentioned research as a 
guide to make predictions regarding the warrior class. My predictions are as follows: 
H1: The warrior class is more likely to affiliate with the Republican Party than Democratic 
Party. 
H2: The warrior class is more likely to identify as conservative rather than liberal. 
 One of the compelling features of the TISS survey was the range of questions asked. The 
survey asked many questions asking respondents’ opinions on both foreign and domestic policy, 
as well as ones’ opinions on the proper level of civilian control over the military in matters of 
foreign policy. Furthermore, the TISS survey asked respondents to comment on their level of 
confidence in many institutions like the Presidency and respondents’ perceptions regarding 
political leaders’ level of knowledge about the modern military. I use the TISS data as the 
foundation for hypothesis three. 
H3: The warrior class is more likely to prefer President Bush as Commander-in-Chief of the 
military because he is a Republican to President Obama.  
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 Using two specific questions from the TISS survey, I analyze pre-9/11 attitudes regarding 
the Presidency and politicians’ perceived knowledge of the military to make these predictions. 
The first question specifically asks, “How knowledgeable do you think our political leaders are 
about the modern military: 1) very knowledgeable, 2) somewhat knowledgeable, 3) somewhat 
ignorant, 4) very ignorant, or 5) no opinion)?” I create a dummy variable from this question 
coding “very knowledgeable” and “somewhat knowledgeable” as 1 and “somewhat ignorant” 
and “very ignorant” as 0. I drop “no opinion” responses. I use this variable as the dependent 
variable in a logistic regression using three independent variables in model one. The independent 
variables are Political Ideology (7-point scale/1=Far Left, 2=Very Liberal, 3=Somewhat Liberal, 
4=Moderate, 5=Somewhat Conservative, 6=Very Conservative, and 7=Far Right), Republican, 
and Democrat. I create a dummy variable for Republican coding it as 1 and all other affiliations 
as 0. Democrat is also a dummy variable coded as 1 and all others 0. I then control for military 
service in model two using a dummy variable I create from a question asking if respondents had 
ever served in the military (1=Military Service, 0=Civilian).  
 In model one of Table 7 below, we see that Political Ideology is statistically significant 
where respondents who lean more to the right are less likely to think political leaders are 
knowledgeable of the modern military. Democrats, on the other hand, are also statistically 
significant but more likely to feel political leaders are knowledgeable of the military. As Thomas 
Ricks (1997a,b) alluded, military members are more likely to feel political leaders are ignorant of 
the modern military (less likely to feel political leaders are knowledgeable of military). This 
variable is statistically significant as seen below in model two. 
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Table 7: Political Leaders’ Knowledge of the Modern Military 
 
DV: Political Leaders are Knowledgeable 
Independent Variables 
Model 1 



















































Note: Logistic Regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. The Dependent variable is perceptions of Political Leaders’ 
Knowledge of the Modern Military. Actual survey question: “How knowledgeable do you think our political leaders are about the 
modern military: 1) very knowledgeable 2) somewhat knowledgeable 3) somewhat ignorant 4) very ignorant 5) no opinion?” 
**p<.05; Data is from 1998 to 1999 Triangle Institute for Security Studies Survey on the Military in the Post-Cold War Era. 
 
 The second question I use from the TISS survey specifically asks, “The following is a list 
of some institutions in this country [Presidency]. As far as these institutions are concerned, 
would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any 
confidence in them?” I create a dummy variable from this question coding “great deal of 
confidence” and “only some confidence” as 1 and “hardly any confidence” as 0. I drop responses 
for “no opinion.” I also use this variable as a dependent variable in a logistic regression, and use 
the same independent variables and control variable in two separate models as in Table 7 above. 
 Model one of Table 8 below shows respondents who lean more to the right are less likely 
to have confidence in the President. Republicans are also statistically significant and less likely 
to have confidence in the President. Likewise, Democrats are statistically significant but more 
likely to have confidence in the President. However, military members show no indication of 
lack of confidence in the Presidency as seen in model two. 
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Table 8: Confidence in the President 
 
DV: Confidence in POTUS 
Independent Variables 
Model 1 



















































Note: Logistic Regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. The Dependent variable is confidence in the Presidency. Actual 
survey question: “The following is a list of some institutions in this country [Presidency]. As far as these institutions are 
concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence in them?” 
**p<.05; Data is from 1998 to 1999 Triangle Institute for Security Studies Survey on the Military in the Post-Cold War Era. 
 
 
 Of note, the TISS survey used in the above analyses was conducted in the late 1990s when 
Democrat President Bill Clinton was Commander-in-Chief. The direction and significance of the 
independent variables in each analysis is understandable considering the nature of partisanship 
and political ideology in the United States. The military, on the other hand, does show some 
indications of political neutrality where the President is concerned as discussed by some of the 
early civil-military relations scholars. However, the military’s perception of political leaders’ 
knowledge of the modern military might be an indicator of the military’s growing contempt for 
civil society as discussed by some of the later scholars.  
 While “political leader” is vague in this context, it could mean anyone from town mayor 
to Member of Congress. It could also mean President of the United States. It is reasonable to 
assume that military members might perceive “political leaders” as more knowledgeable of the 
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military if those leaders’ partisanship and ideology aligns more with the military as indicated in 
Table 7. Thus, predicting the warrior class identifies as conservative and Republican, I 
hypothesize the warrior class will prefer President Bush as CINC of the military to President 
Obama in hypotheses three. Although the analysis results in Table 8 do not lend any credence to 
this hypothesis, remember this analysis used a variable for the military, writ large, as opposed to 
variables for a warrior class. The warrior class may be stauncher in their ideology and firm in 
their partisanship. 
Data and Methods 
 Using both logistic regression and ordered logistic regression, I test my hypotheses using 
data from the March 2014 survey of post-9/11 combat veterans conducted by The Washington 
Post and Kaiser Family Foundation. This is the same dataset I use in Chapters One and Two. 
Keep in mind, there was no civilian data collected for this survey. There were 819 adult 
responses in this survey, all of who served in Iraq, Afghanistan, or both. 231 respondents were 
on active duty at the time they took the survey.  
 Dependent Variables. I use four dependent variables to test my hypotheses. Each 
dependent variable coincides with my hypotheses, respectively. The dependent variables are 
Republican, Political Ideology, Obama, and Bush. I also use Republican and Political Ideology 
as control variables in some analyses in this chapter.  
 I operationalize Republican using a question from the WAPO/KFF dataset. The question 
specifically asks, “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as: 0) Other Affiliation 
(2.6%), 1) A Republican (27.6%), 2) A Democrat (16.8%), 3) An Independent (47.3%), 4) 
None/no party affiliation (0%), or 8/9) Don’t know/refused (5.6%)?” I create a dummy variable 
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for Republican coding it as 1 (27.6%) and all other responses as 0 (66.8%). I drop responses for 
“don’t know/refused” (5.6%). 
 I use a question from the same survey asking one’s political views to operationalize 
Political Ideology. The question asks, “Generally speaking, would you describe your political 
views as 1) Very conservative (11.4%), 2) Somewhat conservative (31.9%), 3) Moderate 
(30.5%), 4) Somewhat liberal (14.8%), 5) Very liberal (4.4%), or 8/9) Don’t know/refused 
(7.1%)?” I keep Political Ideology as a categorical variable but reverse the order so “Very 
liberal” is 1 and “Very conservative” is 5. I drop responses for “Don’t know/refused.” 
 The Obama dependent variable reflects opinions of President Obama’s abilities as 
Commander-in-Chief of the military. The question I use to operationalize this variable asks, 
“Please tell me whether the following statement applies to Obama or not: He is a good 
commander-in-chief of the military.” Responses are “yes” (40.1%), “no” (49.4%), or “don’t 
know/refused” (10.5%). I create a dummy variable dropping “don’t know/refused” responses and 
code “yes” as 0 and “no” as 1, assuming the warrior class will not feel President Obama is a 
good CINC of the military. 
 I create the Bush dependent variable in similar fashion where opinions reflect President 
Bush’s past abilities as CINC. The question I use asks, “Thinking back to when George W. Bush 
was president, was he a good commander-in-chief of the military, or not?” Responses are “yes” 
(66.9%), “no” (26.4%), or “don’t know/refused” (6.8%). I also create a dummy variable for this 
question dropping “don’t know/refused” responses and code “no” as 0 and “yes” as 1, assuming 
the warrior class feels President Bush was a good CINC. 
 Independent Variables. I use the same four independent variables I use in Chapter Two 
to conduct my analyses in this chapter. These four key variables are the dimensions of the 
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warrior class I created from factor analysis in Chapter One: Attitude, Warhood, Spartans, and 
Professional.24 In Chapter One, I used eight other variables in my factor analysis to create these 
four independent variables from the dimensions of the warrior class revealed in that analysis. 
Each independent variable is comprised of two distinct variables of the eight variables used in 
the analysis. The Attitude variable is comprised of Patriotic and Moral_Ethical. Brotherhood and 
War_Pride account for the Warhood variable. Spartans is comprised of Longer_Combat and 
Combat_Arms while the Professional variable is comprised of Career_Oriented and 
Family_Trade. 
 Control Variables. I use the same control variables created in Chapter Two in my 
analyses in this chapter. These variables are: Rank (1=enlisted, 2=NCO, 3=warrant officer, 
4=officer), Race (1=Asian/Native American/Alaskan/Pacific Islander, 2=Black, 3=White), Age 
(18 to 77), Education (lowest to highest grade obtained), Christian (=1, all other religions=0), 
Republican (=1), Political Ideology (1=very liberal, 5=very conservative), and Male (=1).25 
Findings 
 I test my first hypothesis using logistic regression where I predict the warrior class will 
affiliate more with the Republican Party. As seen below in model one of Table 9, I analyze the 
effects of just the warrior class variables against the Republican dependent variable. The Attitude 
dimension is the only warrior class factor that is statistically significant and more likely to 
identify with the Republican Party. Applying control variables in model two, we see that Attitude 
remains statistically significant and more likely to identify as Republican along with race and 
political ideology. Under model two, whites and conservatives are more likely to affiliate with 
the Republican Party. 
                                                
24 Note from Chapter Two the summary statistics of the four warrior class variables. 
25 Note Table 2 from Chapter Two, which shows ordinary least-squares regression results using warrior class factors 
as DVs and control variables as IVs.  
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 The results of my analysis in Table 9 support H1 in that the warrior class is more likely to 
identify as Republican, albeit only one dimension of the warrior class. Attitude is comprised of 
Patriotic and Moral_Ethical variables. This dimension believes they are more patriotic and have 
higher moral and ethical values than the rest of civilian society. Whites are also more likely to 
identify as Republican. This is consistent with past research in voting behavior (Abramson, et al. 
2011). Whites also make up the majority of military personnel (66.1% in the WAPO/KFF data). 
Conservatives are also more likely to identify with the Republican Party, which is consistent 
with past political behavior research (Fiorina, et al. 2006, 46-7). 
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Table 9: Political Party Identification of the Warrior Class 
 
DV = Republican  
Independent Variables 
Model 1  
(Warrior Class Only) 
Model 2 
















































































































Note: Logistic regression.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  The Dependent variable is Republican. Actual survey question: 
“Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as: a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, none/no party affiliation, 
don’t know/refused?” **p<.05; Data is from August 1 to 15 December, 2013 The Washington Post and Kaiser Family 
Foundation Survey of Iraq and Afghanistan Active Duty Soldiers and Veterans. Independent variables in bold are dimensions of 
the Warrior Class. 
 
 My second hypothesis predicts the warrior class is more likely to lean conservative in their 
political ideology. I test this hypothesis using ordered logistic regression and political ideology 
as the dependent variable. I first test this hypothesis using only the warrior class independent 
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variables. Model one in Table 10 below shows the Attitude and Professional dimensions of the 
warrior class are statistically significant and more likely to identify as conservatives. When I 
apply control variable in model two, Attitude is no longer significant but Professional remains 
significant. Likewise, Rank, Christians, Republicans, and Males are more likely to lean 
conservative. The rank variable shows that as rank increases, the likelihood of leaning more 
conservative also increases.  
 The results in Table 10 show at least one dimension of the warrior class (Professional) is 
more likely to lean conservative, which supports H2. This dimension consists of those who chose 
to make the military a career when they enlisted. The other component of this dimension is that 
military service is a family tradition, meaning those who are characterized by this factor have 
both a parent and a grandparent who served in the military. Military service is generational for 
those who comprise the Professional dimension of the warrior class. A strong, positive 
correlation between Professional and political ideology is understandable considering past 
research on factors that influence one’s party identification and political ideology. One of the 
first studies on voting behavior (the Columbia studies) found that one’s family is the main 
influencer of partisanship (Berelson, et al. 1954). Later studies supported this idea, but found 
parents and family are also strong influencers of one’s political ideology (Niemi and Jennings 
1991; Jennings, et al. 2009). 
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Table 10: Political Ideology of the Warrior Class 
 
DV = Political Ideology (1=very liberal, 5=very conservative)  
Independent Variables 
Model 1  
(Warrior Class Only) 
Model 2  
















































































































Note: Ordered logistic regression.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  The Dependent variable is Political Ideology. Actual 
survey question: “Generally speaking, would you describe your political views as very conservative, somewhat conservative, 
moderate, somewhat liberal, very liberal, or don’t know/refused?” **p<.05; Data is from August 1 to 15 December, 2013 The 
Washington Post and Kaiser Family Foundation Survey of Iraq and Afghanistan Active Duty Soldiers and Veterans. Independent 




 Hypothesis three predicts the warrior class will feel President Bush was a better CINC of 
the military in the post-9/11 era over President Obama. I conduct my analysis using logistic 
regression in multiple parts. First, I measure warrior class attitudes towards President Obama 
using the Obama dependent variable. I use the warrior class independent variables in my first 
regression as seen below in model one of Table 11. Analysis results in model one show the 
Professional dimension of the warrior class is more likely to think Democrat President Obama is 
not a good CINC of the military. Next, I apply control variables to the regression. Results are 
shown in model two below and indicate none of the warrior class dimensions think Obama is not 
a good CINC. However, Race, Republican, and Political Ideology are all statistically significant 
predictors. As the results show, whites, Republicans, and conservatives are more likely to feel 
President Obama is not a good CINC of the military. 
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Table 11: Warrior Class Attitudes Towards President Obama 
 
DV = Obama (not a good CINC) 
Independent Variables 
Model 1 
(Warrior Class Only) 
Model 2 

























































































































Note: Logistic regression.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  The Dependent variable is Obama. Actual survey question: 
“Please tell me whether the following statement applies to Obama, or not? He is a good commander-in-chief of the military.” 
**p<.05; Data is from August 1 to 15 December, 2013 The Washington Post and Kaiser Family Foundation Survey of Iraq and 




 I then test H3 using logistic regression and Bush as the dependent variable. I run two 
models using only the warrior class variables in the first model and apply control variables in the 
second model. Results of my analysis are shown below in Table 12. As seen in the first model, 
Attitude is the only dimension of the warrior class to the think President Bush was a good CINC. 
When I apply control variables in model two, none of the dimensions of the warrior class think 
Bush was a good CINC. Likewise, race is no longer a statistically significant factor for this 
prediction. However, Republicans and conservatives are both likely to feel President Bush was a 
good CINC of the military. 
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Table 12: Warrior Class Attitudes Towards President Bush 
 
DV = Bush (was a good CINC) 
Independent Variables 
Model 1 
(Warrior Class Only) 
Model 2 

























































































































Note: Logistic regression.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  The Dependent variable is Bush. Actual survey question: 
“Thinking back to when George W. Bush was president, was he a good commander-in-chief of the military, or not?” **p<.05; 
Data is from August 1 to 15 December, 2013 The Washington Post and Kaiser Family Foundation Survey of Iraq and 




 The results of my analyses found in Tables 11 and 12 do not support my third hypothesis. 
The warrior class does not feel President Bush was a better CINC of the military than President 
Obama. However, two variables that remain stable in my analysis of H3 are party identification 
and political ideology. If we substitute “opinion” for “vote” then my analysis of H3 supports 
many extant theories of voting behavior.26 
 One of the first studies on voting behavior was the Columbia studies from the early 
1950s. Berelson, et al. (1954) posited that sociological contexts such as family, friends, and work 
cohorts are the main influencing factors on a person’s voting decisions (Berelson, et al. 1954). 
The study’s findings also showed that one’s family is the main influencer of partisanship while 
voters’ friends and co-workers reinforced existing opinions and biases. Later studies on voting 
behavior, dubbed the Michigan model, posited one’s party identification as the main predictor of 
how a person will vote in an election (Campbell, et al. 1960). This study also found that party 
identification is formed early in one’s life and mostly learned from their parents. In this model, 
party identification is characterized by stability while being resistant to opposing influences 
(Campbell, et al. 1960). Likewise, the Michigan studies found voters are hardly influenced by 
ideology when casting their votes, holding their party identification in higher regard than to the 
issues in a campaign (Campbell, et al. 1960; Achen 1975). 
 While party identification is an important factor for vote choice, it is reasonable that 
military members can determine for themselves the competence of candidates and decide who 
would make a good CINC, regardless of party affiliation. However, this is not necessarily the 
case as my analysis shows. Richard Johnston’s (2006) theory of party identification as the 
unmoved mover may provide some explanation to military members’ preference for CINC. 
                                                
26 The WAPO/KFF survey did not ask respondents whether or not they voted for Bush and/or Obama. 
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  Johnston asserts that party identification is not entirely an unmovable factor and 
examines this from the perspective of the magnitude of shock required to move identification and 
how much it moves in the short run (Johnston 2006). Previous scholars had applied rational 
choice theory as a model for party identification concluding it was a summation of 
considerations accumulated to date in a voter’s life (Ordeshook 1976; Fiorina 1981; Calvert and 
MacKuen 1985; see Johnston 2006, 333). They also concluded that considerations of 
identification are susceptible to movement in the short run, “at least to displacement of intensity 
(Johnston 2006, 333).” As theories of party identification evolved, scholars conceded that events 
such as campaigns, debates, or war, could move identifications in the short run (Markus and 
Converse 1979; Miller 1991) but diminish in relevance as the voter ages (Franklin and Jackson 
1983).  
 Johnston further points out that the clearest evidence of the rational choice perspective is 
the “macropartisanship” claim, whereby “party identification is continuously updated as a 
reflection of economic performance and presidential approval (Johnston 2006, 333; see 
MacKuen, et al. 1989).” This view is similar to Morris Fiorina’s concept of retrospective 
evaluations where voters’ preference or attitude towards a party is contingent on past governing 
performance (Fiorina 1981). Johnston’s thesis also suggests that Campbell et al.’s (1960) original 
Michigan model of voter behavior, where elections are largely decided on fixed party 
identifications, is not entirely a thing of the past.  
 While he concludes that party identification is a “mover but not entirely unmoved,” 
Johnston points out the impact of “partisan predisposition on opinion and values, on perceptions 
of performance and of candidates, on issue-position imputations for candidates, and the vote 
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itself (Johnston 2006, 347).” In other words, party identification influences opinions, perceptions 
of candidates, and positions on issues as opposed to those factors influencing party identification. 
 Lastly, Larry Bartels (2000) argues that the conventional wisdom regarding the decline of 
parties is exaggerated and outdated (Bartels 2000). He shows that partisan loyalties in the 
American public have rebounded significantly for both presidential and congressional elections, 
since the 1970s. The implication of his research supports the idea that although opinions and 
attitudes regarding issues, candidates, and incumbent performance may change (mover), party 
identification may stay the same (unmoved). 
 My analysis of H3 indicates that party affiliation is unmoved despite opinions or 
preferences for Bush and Obama. Military members are mostly conservative and affiliate with 
the Republican Party. Likewise, military Republicans and conservatives feel President Bush was 
a good Commander-in-Chief of the military while President Obama is not. Tables 11 and 12 
show that military members’ party identification and political ideology remain stable and 
influence their attitudes of either President as Commander-in-Chief of the military. However, 
there is no quality or indicator that brings about the same attitudes and opinions in the warrior 
class when controlling for party identification and political ideology.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter was largely motivated by long-standing assumptions regarding military 
political preferences and attitudes. Early civil-military relations scholars, namely Samuel 
Huntington and Morris Janowitz, suggested military members should absolve themselves from 
political matters in order to remain focused on the important task of running the military 
(Huntington 1957). While Huntington (1957) believed the “military mind” was mostly 
conservative but absent from politics, Janowitz (1971) also believed the military should be 
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neutral in political matters but predicted political attitudes and preferences would closely mirror 
that of civil society since the military is a representation of the society it serves. Both scholars 
agreed on the conservative nature of the military although their definition of “conservative” in 
the military context may have had an entirely different meaning (see Janowitz 1971, 242). 
 Decades later, civil-military scholars reacted to Thomas Ricks’ (1997a,b) unscientific 
observation that the military was becoming increasingly Republican and conservative leaning in 
their political ideology. Two seminal studies, the FPLP and TISS surveys, found Rick’s assertion 
mostly true. However, the objective of both studies was to test Ricks’ observation by surveying 
mid and senior-level officers. Ricks’ observation was based on interviews with junior officers 
and enlisted men. 
 In this chapter, I used warrior class variables created in Chapter One to support Ricks’ 
assumption and empirical findings in the FPLP and TISS that military members (I substitute with 
warrior class) mostly identify with the Republican Party and lean conservative in political 
ideology. I made one more prediction in this chapter: the warrior class feels President Bush was 
a good Commander-in-Chief of the military because he is Republican and feel the opposite of 
President Obama. 
 Using logistic regression, I found the Attitude dimension of the warrior class is more 
likely to affiliate with the Republican Party. This dimension includes those who believe they are 
more patriotic and have higher moral and ethical standards than the rest of society. I also found 
that whites and conservatives are more likely to identify as Republican. I then used ordered 
logistic regression and found the Professional dimension of the warrior class is more likely to 
lean conservative. Those who have a family tradition of military service and chose to make the 
military a career characterize this dimension. I also found rank, religion, party affiliation, and 
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gender are statistically significant predictors of one’s political ideology. As rank increases, the 
chance of leaning conservative also increases. Christians, Republicans, and males are also more 
likely to lean conservative. 
 Although Ricks’ observation and empirical research conducted by the FPLP and TISS 
occurred prior to 9/11 with a peacetime military, my analyses show there is still empirical 
support for Ricks’ 1997 assertion after 14 years of war. However, the FPLP and TISS did not 
account for sub-groups or sub-cultures in the military. I accounted for this in my analyses and 
found that the warrior class (sub-culture) is more likely to affiliate with the Republican Party and 
lean more conservative in political ideology. 
 Lastly, despite the warrior class dimensions, I found party identification and political 
ideology are stable predictors for military members’ attitudes towards Presidents Bush and 
Obama. Republicans and conservatives are more likely to feel President Bush was a good CINC 
of the military, but also believe President Obama is not a good CINC for the military. One 
inference from these findings is that military Republicans and conservatives might prefer a 




 Throughout this dissertation I argue that sub-groups or sub-cultures within the military 
exist. The attitudes and beliefs of these groups have the potential to cast perceptions and 
stereotypes that represent the military as a whole. Extant research in civil-military relations fails 
to account for these sub-groups when comparing attitudes and behavior within the military and 
between the military and society. Society may hold the military in high esteem, often above all 
other national institutions, but scholars agree that not all soldiers are the same or hold the same 
values and beliefs. In essence, there is a distinction between a soldier and a warrior (Moskos 
1976, 62; Abrams and Bacevich 2001), and this distinction has consequences for civil-military 
research. I generalized a set of related characteristics that describe a small military sub-group to 
ameliorate this problem. I refer to this group as the warrior class. 
 I broadly defined a warrior class as a society’s military population that believes they are 
more patriotic and have higher moral and ethical values than the rest of the very society they 
serve (Clausewitz 1976; Coker 2002; Bacevich 2005). The warrior class is not exclusive to either 
officer or enlisted ranks. However, they are military career oriented serving in military 
occupations that make up the combat arms; those closest to the front lines (Pressfield 2011). The 
warrior class has seen more combat in Iraq and Afghanistan than the average soldier and holds 
close the soldier bonds and brotherhood made in war (Rielly 2000; Buckingham 1999; Wong 
2005). They are overtly proud of their war service, while military service is generational to them, 
meaning military service is a family trade (Clausewitz 1976; Builder 1989). 
 In Chapter One I developed an operationalized definition of the warrior class in order to 
examine attitudes and beliefs common in discussions regarding civil-military relations. I did this 
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using a statistical method called factor analysis. Factor analysis creates a small set of variables 
from a larger set and creates indexes with variables that measure similar things, conceptually 
(Torres-Reyna 2012). I employed factor analysis using eight variables that characterize the 
warrior class. My analysis revealed four unique dimensions of the warrior class. I named these 
dimensions Attitude, Warhood, Spartans, and Professional.  
 Based on my analysis, I refined my definition of the warrior class as follows: The warrior 
class is a sub-group within the U.S. military characterized by four unique dimensions inherent in 
this group. The first dimension consists of those who believe they are more patriotic and have 
higher moral and ethical values than the rest of society. The second dimension consists of those 
who have great pride in their war service and hold close the bonds of brotherhood forged in 
combat. The third dimension has spent more time in combat than any other soldier as members 
of the military’s combat arms specialties. The last dimension of the warrior class consists of 
those who chose to make the military a career and come from families where military service is a 
family tradition. 
 In Chapter Two I examined the implications of the existence of a warrior class. Based on 
comments by senior military leaders and others in the media, I sought to answer if the military is 
losing touch with the American people. I examined this question using four questions from the 
WAPO/KFF survey. The first three questions gauged military attitudes towards positive civilian 
sentiments regarding the military. The fourth question specifically asked military respondents if 
they felt a disconnection with civilian society. I predicted the warrior class would reject positive 
civilian sentiments towards the military, indicating the military is losing touch with society. I 
then predicted the warrior class would feel disconnected with civilian society. 
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 I found the warrior class does not reject positive civilian sentiments towards the military 
in my analyses of the first three questions. In some cases, they embraced them. Based on the first 
three questions, I implied that the military might not be losing touch with the society it serves. 
However, I found the warrior class does feel a disconnection with civilian society after I 
analyzed the fourth question. I implied the military is losing touch with the society they serve 
based on the warrior class’s feeling of disconnection with civil society. 
 Some of the first scholars in American civil-military relations made the assertion that the 
military is apolitical, meaning politics is beyond the scope of the military professional. In 1997, 
Thomas Ricks made the observation that the military was becoming more Republican and 
conservative. The FPLP and TISS sought to empirically test Ricks’ observation. Both studies 
confirmed his observation: the military is mostly conservative and affiliates with the Republican 
Party.  
 I tested these same observations in Chapter Three. I predicted the warrior class is more 
likely to affiliate with the Republican Party and lean more conservative. My analysis confirmed 
my prediction: the warrior class leans more conservative in political ideology and affiliates more 
with the Republican Party. I then explored warrior class attitudes towards the only two presidents 
to serve as Commander-in-Chief of the military post-9/11, Presidents Bush and Obama. I 
predicted the warrior class would feel President Bush was a good CINC of the military over 
President Obama. My analysis found the warrior class has no significant attitudes of either 
president as Commander-in-Chief. Instead, I found partisanship and political ideology are stable 
predictors for military attitudes towards the two presidents. A broader inference from these 
findings is that although the warrior class affiliates more with the Republican Party and leans 
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more conservative in political ideology, this has no bearing on their preference for Commander-
in-Chief of the military. 
Implications 
 This dissertation shows that a warrior class does exist in the military. The implications 
for this can have profound effects on the way society perceives and stereotypes the military. In 
essence, the attitudes and beliefs of a few can create an image for the military as a whole. While 
current civil-military research measures military attitudes by demographic variables such as rank, 
branch of service, military occupational specialty, education, race, age, and gender, these 
variables do not capture the attitudes of sub-cultures. The warrior class may not be the only sub-
group within the military, but using the concept to measure such a group by factor analysis or 
any other data reduction method can potentially change the way we gauge civil-military 
relations. 
 This concept is important because the military (and society) is not just categorized by 
rank, race, age, education, gender, or party affiliation. Yes, these variables are important for 
understanding different phenomena in the political world. However, to deny or neglect the 
concept of sub-cultures in civil-military relations research will result in incomplete analyses of 
phenomena that cannot be explained by conventional demographic variables. The military is a 
relatively small population compared to other sectors in the civilian world, albeit complex. Using 
a measure for these sub-groups and cultures can help explain these complexities. 
 Future civil-military research should incorporate a measure for these sub-groups and 
cultures to gain a better understanding of the military’s relationship with civil society. To date, 
the most thorough and comprehensive data we have comes from the pre-9/11 TISS survey. 
Seemingly, this dataset has outlived its relevance and explanatory power, rapidly approaching 
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obsoletion. The civilian and military worlds have certainly changed since 9/11. I recommend a 
similar, if not an exact replica, of the TISS survey in order to capture military and civilian 
attitudes in the post-9/11 era. From a civil-military relations perspective, this dissertation would 
be more thorough if the data I used captured civilian attitudes so I could compare the two sectors. 
However, gauging the attitudes and perceptions of just the warrior class is a good starting point. 
 In closing, I found a more thorough way to measure pervasive discussions in civil-
military relations, particularly in the “gap” literature and research. Extant research neglects to 
account for sub-groups or sub-cultures within the military. Researchers should not think such 
groups do not exist or do not have any effect on how we think about the military, whether it is a 
warrior class or any other sub-group we identify. This dissertation expands our knowledge of 
how we think about the military. It further engages scholarly research in civil-military relations 
to account for such groups when measuring behavioral and attitudinal cleavages between the 
military and civilian worlds. As more current civil-military surveys and data become readily 
available, my concept of a warrior class and statistical methods I used to define it may serve as a 
benchmark to better understand civilian-military cleavages. Lastly, this dissertation can help 
policymakers, senior military leaders, and members of the media identify the source of such 
cleavages and reduce existing civil-military barriers as well as stereotypes regarding our military. 
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Appendix A: Crosstab of Military and Part Identification (TISS) 
 

































































Note: Crosstab using Military and Part Identification variables. Military variable is a dummy variable using question 68 from the 
TISS data where 0=Civilian and 1=Military. Party Identification variable is renamed from question 76 using same data; Data is 
from 1998 to 1999 Triangle Institute for Security Studies Survey on the Military in the Post Cold War Era. 
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Appendix B: Crosstab of Military and Political Ideology (TISS) 
 













































































































Note: Crosstab using Military and Political Ideology variables. Military variable is a dummy variable using question 68 from the 
TISS data where 0=Civilian and 1=Military. Political Ideology variable is renamed from question 75 using same data; Data is 




Civilian Liberals (Far Left, Very Liberal, Somewhat Liberal) = 22.9% 
Civilian Conservatives (Far Right, Very Conservative, Somewhat Conservative) = 45.2% 
 
 
Military Liberals (Far Left, Very Liberal, Somewhat Liberal) = 10.2% 
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